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FRIENDS AS FIDUCIARIES 
ETHAN J. LEIB∗ 
This Article argues that the law of fiduciary duties provides a good 
framework for friends to understand their duties to one another better, 
gives courts a useful set of rhetorical and analytical tools to employ when 
they are forced to entertain disputes that arise between close friends, and, 
finally, can help direct courts to furnish betrayed friends certain kinds of 
remedies that are most appropriate for achieving justice within that 
dispute context. This is not the first Article to make an effort to expand the 
reach of the fiduciary concept into new sorts of relationships that are not 
always considered within the ambit of fiduciary duty law. But the case for 
thinking of friends as fiduciaries is exceedingly persuasive and 
underappreciated, both in the law and in our lives. 
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John and David are both thirty-three years old and have been friends 
since college. They are not merely casual friends but stay in touch 
regularly and are important parts of each other’s lives. They share 
intimacies, secrets, confidences, and trust each other with almost 
everything. If asked, they would surely say that they love each other and 
find each other to be very close to the center of their respective circles of 
affection.  
For some years, both have been looking for a way out of academia and 
a way to pay for their children’s private school tuitions. They have often 
imagined that they would pursue a business venture together and, given 
their competencies and interests, assumed that an environmentally friendly 
beverage company in China would suit them well. They also both believed 
that the venture would enrich them professionally and financially. 
Although they had been chatting casually about the plan for four years, 
neither had taken any affirmative steps to make the company a reality and 
neither had suggested to the other that their business idea was confidential. 
Last year, David was approached by a wealthy acquaintance, Daniel, 
who was setting up shop in Beijing. Daniel casually knew David and John 
from college but knew nothing of their plan to go into business together. 
David, assuming that his “green” beverage company was unlikely to 
become a reality with John anytime soon (John was in the middle of 
researching his next book in South Korea and seemed, for the moment, 
fulfilled by the academic life), pitched Daniel on the idea. Daniel loved the 
plan and quickly set up Datong Drinks, a drink company that preached the 
unity of earth and man. Reasonable projections suggest that the company 
will be hugely profitable over the next five years. David was given a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/3
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consulting contract by Datong (as a finder’s fee reward, of sorts) worth 
one million dollars. 
John had been traveling in South Korea doing research over the last 
year and stopped in Beijing recently on his way home. He went to his 
favorite coffee shop in the hutongs of Beijing and asked for a drink menu. 
He ordered a Datong “double green” iced tea. When he read the label, he 
was surprised to learn that someone else had beaten him to the punch on 
his business idea with David: the label was explicitly environmentalist. 
But then he noticed that the president of the company was Daniel—
someone he knew from college.  
He called Daniel in Beijing and they met up over some duck and beer. 
Daniel told John the story of Datong and told him of David’s role in the 
development of the idea and his one million dollar contract.  
John became furious and started thinking of ways he might sue David. 
John knew David had betrayed their friendship in selling out their idea to 
Daniel. But he was not sure if he could make out a legal claim against 
David. He knew they had no explicit contract and did not quite think any 
theft claim or intellectual property claim could be sustained.  
But John had just completed reading a biography of Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo. He remembered the famous case of Meinhard v. Salmon—and 
its most notorious pronouncement: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the 
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s 
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is 
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not 
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a 
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity 
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to 
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating 
erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct 
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the 
crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this 
court.1 
John wondered: Did David violate any fiduciary duties to him as his 
friend? Is friendship a kind of “joint adventure” such that David’s actions 
 
 
 1. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted). 
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could be deemed usurpation of what should have been their joint 
opportunity? Were not the two of them in something “jointly, for better or 
for worse,” as Cardozo described Meinhard and Salmon’s venture?2 Did 
David misappropriate information for his own purposes that could be 
deemed confidential? If so, what remedy should be available to John? 
Should David have to share his contract earnings from Datong? Should all 
profits David receives from Datong be disgorged and placed in a 
constructive trust for the benefit of both friends? For John exclusively? 
Should John be compensated from those earnings for his prorated 
contribution to the idea?  
These queries stem neither from a real case nor from some law school 
exam.3 But the central issue they raise—whether friends are fiduciaries for 
some purposes and in some contexts—is not wholly hypothetical either. 
Courts often need to assess whether the duties of friendship in moral life 
can be translated into legal duties. When and if courts do transmogrify 
friendship’s duties into legally cognizable ones, they tend to enforce the 
duties through a set of remedies often considered equitable: disgorgement, 
the constructive trust, restitution. In short, the body of law courts consider 
when presented with fact scenarios like the fictional one just sketched is 
the law of fiduciary duties. And John was not far off in his channeling of 
Cardozo’s Meinhard opinion. In what follows, I defend the use of 
fiduciary duty law to police the activities of close friends in certain 
contexts. Although the example of David’s behavior is illustrative of the 
way a fiduciary duty of friendship might be breached, I hope to provide 
some guidance here on other ways the law of fiduciary duties can be 
employed to monitor the actions of our usually trustworthy close friends or 
those who pose as them.  
 
 
 2. Id. The allusion to marriage in Meinhard is hard to ignore. Indeed, one of the briefs in the 
case emphasized that Meinhard and Salmon were “on terms of social intimacy. They were warm and 
personal friends. In 1901 and 1902 they met each other three or four times a week, frequently dining 
together. In the summer of 1902, and off and on during previous summers, they roomed together.” 
Brief for the Plaintiff before the Appellate Division, Vol. 153 Cases and Points, Appellate Division 
1928 at pp. 1467–70 (folios 675 and 672 of the record), cited in Robert B. Thompson, The Story of 
Meinhard v. Salmon and Fiduciary Duty’s Punctilio, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES (J. Mark Ramseyer 
ed., forthcoming 2009). 
 3. And in which course could such a question be asked anyway? Corporations? Contracts? I 
have stipulated that David and John manage no corporation and that they have never entered a 
contract. Perhaps there is an intellectual property rule (the “idea submission doctrine”) that might be 
applicable. See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 286 P.2d 55 (Cal. 1956); see generally Lionel S. Sobel, The 
Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9 (1994). But let us assume that doctrine does not apply 
here either. Thanks to Eric Goldman for the exposure to the idea submission literature.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/3
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To be sure, the fiduciary concept is still very much contested4 and some 
famously think “there is no subject here.”5 More, many will recoil from 
the idea that friendship, an activity deeply rooted in the private sphere, 
should be subject to legal standards6 (though these people will at least 
learn that, normative arguments aside, our courts do sometimes treat 
friends as fiduciaries). Still, I hope to make the case here that the law of 
fiduciary duties provides a good framework for friends to understand their 
duties to one another better, gives courts a useful set of rhetorical and 
analytical tools to employ when they are forced to entertain disputes that 
arise between close friends, and, finally, can help direct courts to furnish 
betrayed friends certain kinds of remedies that are most appropriate for 
achieving justice within that dispute context. This is not the first article to 
make an effort to expand the reach of the fiduciary concept into new sorts 
of relationships that are not always considered within the ambit of 
fiduciary duty law.7 But the case for thinking of friends as fiduciaries is 
 
 
 4. Of course, a group of committed scholars from common law countries have tried to 
illuminate the concept over the last few decades. See, e.g., LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW 
(2005); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES (1981); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus 
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); 
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal 
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary 
Decisionmaking—Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1985); Deborah A. DeMott, 
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Scott FitzGibbon, 
Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999); Robert Flannigan, The 
Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 (2007); Robert Flannigan, The 
Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1989) [hereinafter Flannigan, The Fiduciary 
Obligation]; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990); Eileen A. Scallen, 
Promises Broken vs. Promised Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 
U. ILL. L. REV. 897; L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; J.C. Shepherd, 
Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW Q. REV. 51 (1981); D. Gordon Smith, 
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib, 
The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975). 
 5. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 38 J.L. & ECON. 
425, 438 (1993).  
 6. I have addressed this objection at length in Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 631, 662–67 (2007), and will not revisit it here. I have also attempted to define the concept of the 
friend, id. at 638–53, so will bracket any definitional challenges here about who may count as a “close 
friend” for purposes of the law’s administration. I will, however, have occasion to discuss more 
specific objections to treating the friend as a fiduciary, infra Part IV. 
 7. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 103 (2004) (arguing that a fiduciary relationship should be recognized between 
consumers who provide personal data and the companies to which they provide them); Harold Brown, 
Franchising: A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1971); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary 
Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006); John Burritt McArthur, The 
Restatement (First) of the Oilfield Operator’s Fiduciary Duty, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 587 (2005); Paul 
B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary Obligation in Clinical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 424 
(2006); Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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exceedingly persuasive and underappreciated, both in the law and in our 
lives. 
The first three parts of this Article contain my affirmative argument. 
Part I begins with a simplified introduction to fiduciary relationships, their 
concomitant obligations, and the remedies breaches of fiduciary duties can 
be expected to trigger. Exploring these three components of fiduciary law 
should reveal the underlying concept of the fiduciary that helps to shape 
the contours of the relationships, the duties, and the common remedies 
courts use in policing fiduciary default. Part II aims to prove that the 
fiduciary concept can be usefully applied to the relationship of friendship; 
the proposal here to treat friends as fiduciaries is not merely metaphorical 
or analogical.8 Part III shows that some courts do, in fact, see the 
relationship of friendship as triggering certain fiduciary duties. This 
grounding in case law helps buttress my normative argument that the law 
should (and can) police betrayed friendships.  
Part IV countenances some objections to the proposal from within the 
fiduciary concept. In particular, I consider whether the presumed equality, 
reciprocity, and free exit attributed to close friendships render the 
fiduciary concept inappropriate. I also consider the possibility that 
thinking of the friend as a fiduciary might do damage to fiduciary law by 
stretching it too far. It might also facilitate the law’s “crowding” out the 
inherent trust friendship promotes and sustains.9 Part V concludes.  
In short, we should accept close friendship as triggering certain 
fiduciary duties. Courts have already started to treat friends as 
fiduciaries—and there is much that can be appreciated about friendship 
itself when friends begin to see their relationships through the lens of the 
fiduciary concept.  
 
 
Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159; Elizabeth S. Scott & 
Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 633, 641 (1983); Jennifer L. White, Note, 
When It’s OK to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing the 
Deaccessioning of Art To Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1041 (1996). 
 8. Cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2419 (explaining that the purpose of their article about 
“parents as fiduciaries” is “to push the analogy beyond rhetoric”). 
 9. The “crowding” thesis is explored in, for example, BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE 
MONEY (1997); Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131 (2001); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 
568–71 (2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/3
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I. THE FIDUCIARY 
Before one can ascertain whether calling friends fiduciaries is simply a 
category mistake, one needs a working understanding of the fiduciary idea 
in the law. Given that “the prevailing view remains that fiduciary law is 
‘elusive,’”10 the cut at the subject here cannot help but be somewhat 
selective and reductive. Still, there is broadscale agreement about much 
having to do with fiduciaries in the law, and I focus here upon those areas 
of agreement. Assume that what I am describing below is the law of the 
last hundred years, leaving the genealogy of the modern fiduciary in the 
Roman “fiducia” and “fidei-commissia” and in the “trusts” of the Middle 
Ages to the historians.11  
A. The Fiduciary Relationship 
There are certain categories of relationships that are virtually always 
treated as fiduciary in nature, and these relationships are often treated as 
paradigmatically fiduciary. They include attorney-client, corporate 
director-shareholders, trustee-beneficiary, managing partner-partner, 
agent-principal, employee-employer, guardian-ward, and physician-
patient.12 Sometimes other relationships are also deemed fiduciary—and, 
like the paradigmatic examples, are treated as such as a mere function of 
the relationship’s existence rather than upon a contextual analysis of the 
quality of the particular relationship.13 The aforementioned relationships 
might be called “formal” fiduciary relationships.14 
But relationships of status are not the only kind of relationships that are 
treated as fiduciary in the law. There are also “informal” fiduciary 
 
 
 10. Smith, supra note 4, at 1400. 
 11. For some of this history, see generally 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987); ERNEST VINTER, A 
TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS (3d ed. 
1955); Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 199 (1992). 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006); FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 306–08 
(citing authorities); Smith, supra note 4, at 1400. There is some debate in the corporate context about 
whether the fiduciary duty is owed to the shareholder or to the corporation—and whether it is the 
director who owes it rather than the board. See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective 
Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929 (2008); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder 
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998). But let’s leave that debate aside here. For the most part, I 
will adopt the convention of calling the first in the dyad a “fiduciary” and the second a “beneficiary.” 
 13. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 211 (listing 
franchisees-franchisors and pharmacists-customers as examples).  
 14. See Smith, supra note 4, at 1412–13. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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relationships, which are identified through more qualitative evaluations. 
These relationships are sometimes called “confidential relationships”15 and 
are often called “fact-based.”16 They are routinely identified when a court 
finds that a relationship of “trust” exists and that one party dominates, is 
superior to, or is especially vulnerable to another party.17 Admittedly, 
vague standards for confidential relationships abound—but there is no 
question that courts embrace many types of relationships based on their 
internal qualities rather than their names. Although this imprecision can be 
frustrating for fiduciary typologists and those who wish the law of 
fiduciary duties to provide firmer guidance on the forms of relationships 
that are susceptible to treatment as fiduciary, no typology of the fiduciary 
could be complete without recognizing a few central features: the concept 
is self-consciously open, flexible, and adaptable to new kinds of 
relationships18—and those relationships trade upon high levels of trust and 
leave one party in a position of domination, inferiority, or vulnerability.19  
 
 
 15. See id. Although some purists might try to exclude confidential relationships from the 
category of fiduciary relationships because they are often treated as somewhat less restrictive than true 
status-based fiduciary relationships, it would be very hard to sustain this neat separation. Indeed, 
courts are not especially principled in highlighting and sustaining such a distinction. See, e.g., Fipps v. 
Stidham, 50 P.2d 680, 683 (Okla. 1935) (“Confidential and fiduciary relations are in law synonymous, 
and exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of 
another.”); Rieger v. Rich, 329 P.2d 770, 778 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (“Confidential or fiduciary 
relationship[s] . . . in law are synonymous.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 318, 658, 1314–15 
(8th ed. 2004) (indicating that confidential relationships are synonymous with fiduciary relationships). 
For more on informal fiduciary relationships in particular, see Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the 
Campfire: Understanding Confidential Relationships, 53 SMU L. REV. 315 (2000); Gregory B. 
Westfall, Comment, But I Know It When I See It: A Practical Framework for Analysis and Argument 
of Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 835 (1992). These last two articles start 
thinking about friendship’s role in fiduciary law but do not get very far.  
 To be sure, there may be some meaningful differences in the burdens of persuasion and burdens of 
proof between the formal and informal fiduciary relationships—those in confidential relationships 
have to show actual reliance and have the burden to prove the existence of the relationship, whereas 
those in formal fiduciary relationships do not need to prove reliance and fiduciaries will have the 
burden to show their transactions were fair—but these differences are not terribly important for my 
purposes here. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1382 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.); Scallen, supra 
note 4, at 907. 
 16. See Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 4, at 301 (“The question—who is a 
fiduciary?—is answered very simply or only after a detailed examination of the facts. It is simply 
answered if the relationship falls within the nominate categories deemed to be fiduciary . . . . Other 
relationships may exceptionally involve a trust equivalent to or stronger than even the closest 
relationship between, for example, a solicitor and a client . . . . These are ‘fact-based’ fiduciary 
relationships.”). For some of the difficulties in specifying the requisites for these relationships, see 
generally Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and 
Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2006). 
 17. See Smith, supra note 4, at 1413–14. 
 18. See Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 (Conn. 1955) (“[E]quity has carefully refrained 
from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as to exclude new 
situations.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/3
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It will only be possible to get more specific about which relationships 
qualify for treatment as fiduciary once one has a firmer understanding of 
the concept of the fiduciary itself. But that effort must await more 
information about what is at stake in calling someone a fiduciary. For that 
reason, I defer further discussion about identifying fiduciary relationships 
until after I explore the fiduciary duties and the remedies associated with 
the breaches thereof. 
B. The Fiduciary Duties 
Once a court determines that a fiduciary relationship has formed 
between parties, courts can be expected to scrutinize the conduct of the 
parties against the background of a set of duties to which fiduciaries must 
conform their behavior. Although the list of “true” fiduciary duties—
duties that are imposed only on fiduciaries—can be quite short (depending 
upon whom you ask), the list of duties that tend to be associated with 
fiduciaries—duties that may also be imposed on other kinds of parties but 
tend to be discussed in the context of fiduciary relationships—is somewhat 
longer.20 Certain fiduciary relationships implicate the majority of the 
mélange of duties that follow, and some trigger only consideration of a 
few. Ultimately, there is stunning variety, both in scope and substance, in 
the set of duties that apply to any given fiduciary relationship.21 Capturing 
the set at a level of generality suffices here.  
The core fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty, a duty of unselfishness.22 
As Professor Lynn Stout puts it:  
 
 
Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 
150 (1981) (“The common law has in fact always defined [informal fiduciary relationships] with 
deliberate imprecision and perhaps surprising expansiveness.”).  
 19. See, e.g., Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 143 N.E. 482, 484 (Ill. 1924) (“[An informal 
fiduciary relationship] exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which 
confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The origin of the confidence is immaterial. It may be 
moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.”); Hoge v. George, 200 P. 96, 102 (Wyo. 1921) (finding 
confidential relationships to exist where “there [i]s confidence reposed on the one side and accepted on 
the other, with a resulting dependence by the one party and influence by the other”). 
 20. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (2007). 
 21. See Davis, supra note 4, at 24–25 (highlighting that duties are much more rigorous in some 
contexts (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 387 (1957)) than others (citing id. 
§ 190 cmt. A; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(1)(3) (1984)); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, 
at 432 (duties deviate substantially depending on which relationship is at issue); Scallen, supra note 4, 
at 910 n.48 (“[L]abelling someone a ‘fiduciary’ does not charge him or her with the same ‘bag of 
duties’ and degree of obligation imposed on all other categories of fiduciaries.”); Scallen, supra note 4, 
at 911 (“The nature of the fiduciary obligation varies depending on the particular factual context.”); 
Smith, supra note 4, at 1483–84. 
 22. But see Scallen, supra note 4, at 908 (“[T]he fiduciary obligation is not one of selflessness; it 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The keystone of the duty of loyalty is the legal obligation that the 
fiduciary use her powers not for her own benefit but for the 
exclusive benefit of her beneficiary. It is highly improper—indeed 
proscribed—for a fiduciary to extract a personal benefit from her 
fiduciary position without her beneficiary’s consent, even when she 
can do this without harming the beneficiary.23 
The fiduciary is prohibited from engaging in self-interested transactions 
and is saddled with the task of pursuing the interests of her beneficiary 
above her own.24 So “inflexible” is the duty of loyalty that it requires a 
fiduciary to be “undivided” and “undiluted” in her fidelity,25 though, of 
course, “[f]iduciaries are not obliged to attend to their fiduciary duties to 
the exclusion of other personal obligations and activities.”26  
Rhetoric aside, from a practical standpoint, this restrictive duty requires 
fiduciaries to pursue self-dealing only after getting an informed waiver 
from her beneficiary and to avoid conflicts of interest, secret profits, and 
misappropriating benefits that should accrue to the beneficiary or the joint 
relationship.27 Even with this most central fiduciary duty, however, the 
strictness with which it will be enforced varies, depending on the type and 
scope of the fiduciary relationship at issue.28 
The second duty that is routinely discussed in connection with 
fiduciaries is the duty of care.29 The duty requires fiduciaries to perform 
their responsibilities for their beneficiaries with reasonable diligence and 
prudence.30 Although the duty resembles a basic requirement to avoid 
negligence,31 the duty is flexible and can require more substantial 
 
 
imposes no duty of altruism. Even in the original fiduciary relationship, that of trustee/beneficiary, 
there is no black letter principle that the trustee must always put the beneficiary’s interest ahead of her 
own.”). 
 23. Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: 
Can a Transplant Take?, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNMENT IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 46, 55 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003). 
 24. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The concept of loyalty, of 
constant, unqualified fidelity, has a definite and precise meaning. The fiduciary must subordinate his 
individual and private interests to his duty . . . whenever the two conflict.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (describing a fiduciary’s duty “to act solely for the benefit of the principal in 
all matters connected with his agency”). 
 25. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989). 
 26. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2426; see also Scallen, supra note 4, at 908 (“[C]lassic 
fiduciary relationships are by no means divorced from self-serving considerations.”). 
 27. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047, 1054–55.  
 28. Smith, supra note 4, at 1482. 
 29. See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW 123–36 (1986). 
 30. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2420. 
 31. Thus some claim that the duty of care is not distinctively fiduciary after all. See Ribstein, 
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diligence than would be required of non-fiduciaries.32 In contrast to the 
predominantly prohibitive nature of the duty of loyalty, the duty of care 
has an affirmative component occasionally requiring affirmative action.33 
Still, in practice the duty of care is relatively weak, at least in the corporate 
context—and it is rare for a fiduciary to run afoul of it. This is because, 
unlike the duty of loyalty, the party alleging a breach must be able to show 
that an injury resulted from the fiduciary’s failure to meet the standard of 
care.34 Furthermore, courts tend to give fiduciaries substantial discretion in 
performing their responsibilities; recklessness and gross negligence tend to 
be the standards as a matter of practice.35 
Aside from these two central fiduciary duties—or, perhaps, growing 
out of them—are a set of duties that are routinely associated with 
fiduciaries. Fiduciaries have a duty of utmost candor and disclosure.36 This 
may take the form of requiring doctors to reveal their personal financial 
interests to their patients (even when those interests are “unrelated to the 
patient’s health”)37 or it may take the form of a general “accounting” 
requirement, necessitating accurate bookkeeping subject to inspection by 
the beneficiary as well as the disclosure of all relevant information 
pertaining to the relationship.38  
The flipside of the disclosure requirement is a duty of confidentiality. 
The professional responsibilities of lawyers and doctors generally prevent 
them from revealing the confidences of their clients and patients, 
respectively. But fiduciaries commonly are required to maintain secrets 
and respect duties of confidentiality. Although commentators have 
 
 
supra note 13, at 223; Smith, supra note 4, at 1409. 
 32. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The responsibility—that is, the care and 
the diligence—required of an agent or of a fiduciary, is proportioned to the occasion. It is a concept 
that has, and necessarily so, a wide penumbra of meaning—a concept, however, which becomes 
sharpened in its practical application to the given facts of a situation.”). 
 33. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047, 1049 & n.8. 
 34. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 656 
(1995). 
 35. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2423–24 (discussing the “business judgment rule,” a 
presumption that corporate directors exercise due diligence, their fiduciary duties notwithstanding). 
 36. See Libby v. L.J. Corp., 247 F.2d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Jordan v. Duffs & Phelps, 815 
F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (enforcing a fiduciary duty of disclosure); Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 
303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (“If dual interests are to be served, the disclosure to be effective 
must lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance.”); DeMott, supra 
note 4, at 882 (fiduciaries “must be candid”); FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 308 (“[The fiduciary] has an 
especially high duty of disclosure: He must go beyond avoiding fraud and false statements; he is 
obliged to ‘volunteer’ information.”). 
 37. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). 
 38. See Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988); Herring v. Offutt, 295 A.2d 876, 
879 (Md. 1972); 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 172, at 452.  
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distinguished between “non-fiduciary” duties of confidentiality and the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty that requires fiduciaries to “refrain from using the 
information for personal advantage,”39 courts can and do discuss the duty 
of confidentiality as part of the general package of fiduciary duties. In 
United States v. Chestman, for example, the Second Circuit identified the 
duty as follows:  
What has been said of an agent’s duty of confidentiality applies 
with equal force to other fiduciary relations: “an agent is subject to 
a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information 
confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him during 
the course of or on account of his agency.”40  
This fiduciary duty is not only the duty not to misappropriate the 
information for the fiduciary’s own use, but is also a duty not to 
communicate the information itself.41 
Perhaps a more controversial duty associated with fiduciaries is the 
duty of good faith.42 It is controversial because many have a hard time 
distinguishing a fiduciary’s duty of good faith from a general duty of good 
faith that pervades all performance of contractual duties.43 Moreover, 
many feel that the duty of good faith is simply a way of expressing duties 
imposed by other obligations, like the duty of disclosure, the duty of 
loyalty, or the duty of care.44 But it is not hard to find courts expressing 
 
 
 39. Smith, supra note 4, at 1460; see also SHEPHERD, supra note 4, at 319 (the doctrine 
respecting confidential information is “analogous to” and “related to” but “different from the law of 
fiduciaries”). But see Ribstein, supra note 13, at 221 (“The duty not to misappropriate is not a 
fiduciary duty . . . .”).  
 40. 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 395 (1958)). 
 41. See Scallen, supra note 4, at 910 (“A fiduciary must not use confidential information 
acquired in the course of his office for his own purposes, or reveal the information to a third person.”). 
It is worth remembering, of course, that one may owe duties of confidentiality without owing other 
“true” fiduciary duties. 
 42. See FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 309; Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(Posner, J.) (“A fiduciary duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost candor, 
rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith”); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753–
57 (Del. Ch. 2005) (identifying duty of good faith), aff’d, 906 A.2d 693 (Del. 2006). 
 43. The general duty of good faith in contractual relations is derived from U.C.C. § 1-304 (2008) 
(“Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or 
enforcement.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement.”). 
 44. See Ribstein, supra note 13, at 211, 223. In many respects, this perspective has been recently 
confirmed in Stone v. Ritter:  
[A]lthough good faith many be described colloquially as part of a “triad” of fiduciary duties 
that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith does not 
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the idea that fiduciaries owe their beneficiaries a higher standard of good 
faith than would be required of mere contract partners:45 “Utmost” good 
faith is the benchmark,46 and the breach of that duty in the fiduciary 
context can lead to much more substantial remedies for the injured.47  
Thus, although some treat the duty of good faith as merely 
“commercially oriented” and different from the “altruism” required of the 
fiduciary,48 the rhetoric of good faith appears with frequency in cases 
imposing and discussing fiduciary duties; it seems that courts have 
something more in mind than the mere contractual duty of good faith. 
Moreover, fiduciaries need not necessarily be bound by contracts 
controlling every aspect of their relationship, so the duty of good faith—
even if it were identical to the contractual duty—could add substance to 
the duties of the fiduciary outside of the contractual portion of their 
relationship with their beneficiaries. For example, prior contractual 
relations do not impose a duty to negotiate in good faith for subsequent 
contracts, only to perform and enforce in good faith the contracts that 
already exist.49 But a fiduciary relationship might trigger a duty to 
negotiate in good faith.50  
 
 
establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care 
and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas 
failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly. 
911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). This recent holding has already been the source of vigorous 
commentary, and many agree that, rhetoric notwithstanding, the good faith obligation for fiduciaries 
retains bite, even if it seems to be subsumed under the larger rubric of the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., 
Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight (UCLA Sch. of Law, 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 07-09), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1006097 
(“[T]his holding may not matter much, because the Stone court makes clear that acts taken in bad faith 
breach the duty of loyalty.”); Letter from Deborah A. DeMott to author (Sept. 12, 2007) (on file with 
author) (“My reading of [Stone and In re Walt Disney Co. Shareholder Derivative Litig.] is that they 
treat the duty of good faith as a subset of the duty of loyalty, clarifying that a director’s duty of loyalty 
encompasses more than the negative duty to refrain from unconsented-to self-dealing.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 
1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (discounting contractual good faith requirement because “[p]arties to a contract 
are not each others’ fiduciaries”). 
 46. Union Miniere, S.A. v. Parday Corp., 521 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); see also 
DeMott, supra note 4, at 882 (fiduciary “must evince utmost good faith”). 
 47. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement 
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1356 (1985) (“[T]he disgorgement principle 
applies to breach of a fiduciary obligation while the expectation principle applies to a breach of 
contractual obligation.”). 
 48. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1727. 
49 See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96, at 570 (4th ed. 2001) (“It is clear 
that, as a matter of common law or the UCC, the obligation of good faith extends only to the contract 
and not to its formation.”). 
 50. Some commentators miss this point because they insist that courts must analyze fiduciary 
obligations “that focus[] on the parties’ positions after their relationship has been established.” 
DeMott, supra note 4, at 893; see also Weinrib, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that courts must look to 
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Finally, when a fiduciary relationship exists between parties, 
misrepresentations of opinion can be actionable as fraud under this 
specialized duty of good faith. In “mere” contractual relations, by contrast, 
often only misrepresentations of fact are actionable, the contractual duty of 
good faith notwithstanding.51 
C. The Fiduciary Remedies 
There is a set of remedies that courts routinely impose when they find a 
breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, if it were not circular and decidedly 
unhelpful in guiding courts, one might even be tempted to define the entire 
field of fiduciary law by the remedies extracted from fiduciaries.52 
Although, like the fiduciary duties themselves, the remedies get enforced 
with variable degrees of strictness depending on the relationship and the 
nature of the breach, there are some general commonalities in the remedies 
used in the fiduciary context. In sum, fiduciaries who breach their duties 
will likely find themselves needing to disgorge their profits, to place their 
earnings in a constructive trust, to restitute their beneficiaries, and/or to 
pay punitive damages. 
Disgorgement often follows from the breach of the duty of loyalty: if a 
fiduciary has betrayed the principle of unselfishness, she will have to 
disgorge all of her profits.53 This remedy is demanded of the defaulting 
fiduciary even if the self-interested transaction caused no harm to the 
beneficiary. For example, a trustee who self-deals with the assets of a trust 
beneficiary will be expected to disgorge his profits even if no damage 
came to the property of the beneficiary.54 At least part of the rationale for 
 
 
parties’ positions after, not before, agreement). This cautionary note makes sense in some cases but not 
others: sometimes the fiduciary relationship preexists a contract and it is precisely there that a duty of 
good faith could have teeth because no contractual duty of good faith has yet arisen. Further, given that 
the moment of formation of fiduciary relations can be fuzzy, see FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 338–39, 
focusing only on “post-consummation” positions can be arbitrary. 
 51. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (“It is 
true that generally a misrepresentation, to be actionable, must be one of fact rather than of opinion. But 
this rule . . . does not apply where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties . . . .”) (internal 
quotation and citations omitted). This rule is not universal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 539, 542, 543 (1989) (offering other examples where reliance on a statement of opinion can lead to 
a cause of action).  
 52. See Sealy, supra note 4, at 72–73. 
 53. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 441; Ribstein, supra note 13, at 223; Scott 
& Scott, supra note 7, at 2422; Scallen, supra note 4, at 912 (“The standard remedy for a breach of 
fiduciary duty is disgorgement of the profits obtained . . . .”); Smith, supra note 4, at 1487. 
 54. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 
94 GEO. L.J. 67, 112 (2005). 
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the disgorgement remedy (beyond a deterrence potential)55 is that 
beneficiaries will rarely be capable of formulating precise expectations; 
they rely on their fiduciaries quite broadly, so measuring damages by the 
fiduciary’s gain can make more sense than an expectancy-based remedy, 
common in contractual breaches.56 Nevertheless, standard “loss stemming 
from breach” damages are also routinely available, if not especially 
distinctive. 
The remedy of disgorgement is often accomplished through a 
“constructive trust” imposed by law (rather than through the intent of an 
individual, as in a plain vanilla trust).57 Indeed, Meinhard v. Salmon itself 
is illustrative. In this case, Salmon appropriated a business opportunity 
that arose from his real estate venture with Meinhard. Salmon’s breach of 
his fiduciary duties to Meinhard resulted in a constructive trust over 
certain assets that should have been shared: “A constructive trust is, then, 
the remedial device through which preference of self is made subordinate 
to loyalty to others.”58 Judge Cardozo had explained the constructive trust 
and its role in the menu of remedies nearly ten years earlier: 
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of 
equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such 
circumstances that the holder of legal title may not in good 
conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a 
trustee.59  
Ultimately, although the “constructive trust originated in cases 
involving breaches of fiduciary obligations by errant trustees” who 
violated their duty of loyalty,60 the constructive trust remedy can be sought 
against a fiduciary even when the predicate duty breached is one other 
than the duty of loyalty. In many American jurisdictions, for example, 
fiduciary and confidential relationships must be shown to qualify for the 
remedy of a constructive trust, but the basis of the remedy can be the 
breach of different duty.61 
 
 
 55. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 214 (2004). 
 56. See Ribstein, supra note 13, at 217. 
 57. See Scallen, supra note 4, at 912. 
 58. 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928). 
 59. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919).  
 60. DAGAN, supra note 55, at 300. 
 61. See Schwartz v. Houss, No. 21741/04, 2005 WL 579152, at *4 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 3, 2005) 
(“It is well settled that in order to set forth a valid cause of action to impose a constructive trust, the 
following four elements must be alleged: ‘(1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise, 
express or implied, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon, and (4) unjust enrichment.’”); Cody v. Gallow, 
214 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1961) (imposing a constructive trust upon finding a confidential 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
680 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:665 
 
 
 
 
Another variation on the theme of equitable remedies available for the 
breach of fiduciary duties is restitution (though disgorgement and the 
constructive trust can, of course, themselves be construed as restitutionary 
remedies). Restitutionary remedies have long been identified with the 
breach of fiduciary duties,62 and they enable beneficiaries to extract from 
their fiduciaries potentially supercompensatory remedies. Even in a 
contract dispute between a fiduciary and her beneficiary, for example, the 
measure of damages might exceed mere expectancy damages and result in 
a payment by the fiduciary that exceeds the standard measure of 
compensation available in contractual relationships.63  
The classic example may be Snepp v. United States.64 Frank W. Snepp 
III was bound by a contractual duty not to publish a book about his 
activities with the Central Intelligence Agency without submitting it to the 
agency for prepublication review. Although no confidential information 
was, in fact, revealed, the courts required Snepp to pay a restitutionary 
rather than a compensatory remedy.65 The fiduciary relationship between 
Snepp and the government triggered supercompensatory remediation even 
though breach of a contractual term usually results only in expectancy 
damages, not a profits-based recovery. Like disgorgement, restitution 
generally “is measured by the amount of the fiduciary’s gain rather than by 
the amount of the beneficiary’s loss.”66  
Still, courts’ use of restitution to achieve equity and to reverse the 
effects of “unjust enrichment” need not be pursued only through a profits-
 
 
relationship without finding a breach of a duty of loyalty); DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATION, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: DUTIES IN ONGOING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 45–46 
(1991). 
 62. See DAGAN, supra note 55, at 237 (“[R]estitution for breach of fiduciary duty is so 
entrenched in Anglo-American law that it is rarely seriously disputed.”); SHEPHERD, supra note 4, at 
373 (claiming that “any comprehensive and effective theory of fiduciaries can be postulated as being 
co-extensive with the law of restitution as a whole”); Smith, supra note 4, at 1408 (observing that “all 
commentators seem to agree that breach of fiduciary duty falls within the boundaries of the law of 
restitution”). 
 63. Of course, a restitutionary remedy can also turn out to be less than expectancy. 
 64. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).  
 65. Id. at 510. In this case, the restitutionary remedy took the form of a constructive trust. Id. The 
categories of disgorgement, constructive trust, and restitution overlap, and are not mutually exclusive 
remedies. But since they are all discussed and deployed in connection with the enforcement of 
fiduciary duties, it seems worthwhile to highlight all three. Some subtleties in the applications of these 
remedies have been explored by JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES: CONTRACT, TORT, 
EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 65–78 (2002); PETER JAFFEY, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF 
RESTITUTION: VITIATED TRANSFERS, IMPUTED CONTRACTS AND DISGORGEMENT 136–38 (2000); 
Daniel Friedmann, Restitution for Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1879, 1880–83 
(2001). 
 66. Smith, supra note 4, at 1493.  
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based remedy. Rather, through restitution, courts may require fiduciaries 
to pay a fair price in an unfair transaction instead of disgorging their 
profits.67 Restitutionary remedies can also be contribution-based: a 
beneficiary can be compensated in accordance with his contribution to an 
enterprise.68 Contribution-based restitutionary remedies undo the effects of 
unjust enrichment in a retrospective way without focusing on profits or 
prospective recovery per se. Although restitution—like disgorgement and 
constructive trusts—is a remedy available to non-fiduciaries as well from 
time to time, it is routinely linked to the fiduciary context. 
Finally, punitive damages may be available in a suit for breach of 
fiduciary duties even though they are not routinely available for breaches 
of contract. Thus, above and beyond disgorgement and other forms of 
restitution, punitive damages may be assessed as well when a breach is 
extreme or a product of malice or fraud.69 
D. The Fiduciary Concept 
With this introduction to all things fiduciary in place, I can endeavor to 
say something more general about the concept of the fiduciary that 
underlies defining the relationship, erecting the set of duties to apply to 
fiduciaries, and determining the appropriate remedy to exact from 
fiduciaries in any given context. Although I cannot aim to settle the long-
standing disputes among those who seek grand unified theories of the 
fiduciary concept70 (and those who think no such unified theory is 
 
 
 67. See Stout, supra note 23, at 50. For an argument that fiduciaries should have to seek the “best 
possible price” rather than a mere “fair price,” see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in 
Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 485–86 (1993). 
 68. For a discussion of contribution-based restitutionary remedies, see DAGAN, supra note 55, at 
167–83. 
 69. See Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Scallen, supra note 4, at 912 (citing 
Vale v. Union Bank, 151 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App. 1979)); Hylid v. Simmons, 378 A.2d 260 (N.J. 
1977)); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1069 (citing Schoenholtz v. Doniger, 657 F. Supp. 899, 
914 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 70. For a sampling of this debate, see, for example, SHEPHERD, supra note 4 (defending an 
account of fiduciaries as “entrustment” leading to “encumbered power” and rejecting property-based 
theories, reliance-based accounts, contractarianism, unjust enrichment theories, and “power and 
discretion theory”); Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 
65 MICH. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (1966) (highlighting the role of the fiduciary as a representative); 
Criddle, supra note 7, at 126 (“The starting point for all fiduciary relations is substitution . . . .”); 
DeMott, supra note 16, at 926 (“[T]he law applicable to fiduciary duty can best be understood as 
responsive to circumstances that justify the expectation that an actor’s conduct will be loyal to the 
interests of another.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426 (defending a “contractarian” theory 
in which fiduciary duties exist as default rules that result from the impossibility of writing complete 
contracts); Frankel, supra note 4, at 808–16 (defending “abuse of power” as the unifying theme of 
fiduciary law); Arthur J. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations 
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possible),71 there are a few relatively uncontroversial propositions about 
the concept upon which almost all could agree. My aim here is not to 
rationalize or justify the bulk of the case law surrounding fiduciaries but 
only to identify some of its organizing attributes. That will enable me to 
assess whether the concept can be fruitfully applied to friendship. 
It is common to observe that fiduciary relationships are relationships of 
trust, where one party trusts another more than would be true in a standard 
commercial transaction. This strong trust tends to result because of the 
fiduciary’s greater expertise in the interaction at issue (like a lawyer’s 
knowledge), greater control over assets (whether real property or 
information), or high degree of influence over a beneficiary’s decision-
making process.72 For this reason, when discussing the fiduciary concept, 
courts often focus upon the fiduciary’s “discretionary authority” or 
“power” over something a beneficiary owns (or over the beneficiary 
himself) and look for resultant dependency or vulnerability in the 
beneficiary.73 The degree of control, complexity, and dominance or the 
broad range of the underlying relationship can also help direct courts in 
 
 
in the Common Law, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 599, 620 (1980) (viewing the shifting of “judgment” as central 
to the fiduciary concept); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, 
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1634–40 (2001) (arguing that 
fiduciary duties are necessary to counteract temptations for opportunism that even strong social norms 
will fail to deter); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949) (arguing that 
fiduciaries can be united in their voluntary undertakings); Smith, supra note 4 (arguing for a “critical 
resource theory” in which all fiduciaries have discretion to dispose of or have power over a 
beneficiary’s critical resource). 
 71. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 4, at 915 (“Described instrumentally, the fiduciary obligation is 
a device that enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one 
person’s discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person’s relationship with 
another. This instrumental description is the only general assertion about fiduciary obligation that can 
be sustained.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). 
The common law imposes [a fiduciary] duty when the disparity between the parties in 
knowledge or power relevant to the performance of an undertaking is . . . vast. . . . If a person 
solicits another to trust him in matters in which he represents himself to be expert as well as 
trustworthy and the other is not expert and accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in 
him, a fiduciary relation is established. . . . [T]he agent has (or claims to have) expert 
knowledge the deployment of which the principal cannot monitor.  
Id.; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426. 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (“A fiduciary 
relationship involves discretionary authority and dependency. . . .”); Landskroner v. Landskroner, 797 
N.E.2d 1002, 1013 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (finding fiduciary relationships to involve cases where 
“special confidence and trust is reposed” with resultant “superiority or influence”); DeMott, supra note 
4, at 902 (“In many relationships in which one party is bound by a fiduciary obligation, the other 
party’s vulnerability . . . justifies the imposition of fiduciary obligation.”); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 
1684 (focusing on power and dependency); Weinrib, supra note 4, at 4–5 (focusing upon a fiduciary’s 
discretion and controlling it). 
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figuring out how strictly to enforce fiduciary duties and how to impose a 
proper remedy.74 Still, the general duties and the menu of standard 
remedies for breach of these duties illuminate something important about 
the threshold of trust necessary to trigger a finding of the relationship in 
the first place. This is why one must know something about the duties and 
remedies before giving a full account of the sorts of relationships that the 
law finds to be fiduciary.75  
So what is notable about the fiduciary duties and remedies and how do 
they help reveal the concept of the fiduciary that guides the finding of a 
fiduciary relationship, the scrutinizing of their duties and obligation, and 
the imposition of a remedy? Most importantly, they evidence special 
concern with policing opportunism and discretion in contexts where 
monitoring costs are very high and bonding is exceedingly important to 
the functioning of the relationship. The duties are relatively stringent 
because the fiduciary has easy access to important resources of her 
beneficiary, and the remedies are supercompensatory in part to deter 
misuse thereof and related misbehavior.76 The fiduciary relationship is one 
especially susceptible to abuse because fiduciaries are especially difficult 
to monitor.77  
Irrespective of one’s approach to understanding the fiduciary—whether 
economic, moralistic, or doctrinal—most agree that the fiduciary concept 
is one that aims to deter and denounce certain kinds of opportunistic 
conduct in specialized relationships in which opportunism is relatively 
easy to accomplish on account of direct access by the fiduciary to assets, 
information, or judgment, accompanied by poor opportunities for 
monitoring by the beneficiary.78 Because trust itself functions as the only 
 
 
 74. See Scallen, supra note 4, at 911 (“Because the fiduciary relationship is based in part upon 
the concept of delegated discretion, the more discretion that must be delegated to the fiduciary, the 
greater the scope of the fiduciary duty.”); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2422 (“[B]oundary of 
fiduciary discretion . . . varies in its strictness in different settings.”); id. at 2424 (“[T]he more complex 
and broad ranging is the fiduciary relationship, the more discretion is needed . . . .”); Smith, supra note 
4, at 1482–84 (strictness, scope, and substance of the duty of loyalty varies with the power of the 
fiduciary). 
 75. See Davis, supra note 4, at 3 (emphasizing enforcement as furnishing the key to the fiduciary 
concept). 
 76. On fiduciary duties and remedies as a deterrent for opportunism, see, for example, Davis, 
supra note 4, at 4; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 441; Scallen, supra note 4, at 912; Scott & 
Scott, supra note 7, at 2423; Smith, supra note 4, at 1405–06, 1487. 
 77. See DAGAN, supra note 55, at 236 (citing EDELMAN, supra note 65, at 85, 216, 244) 
(focusing upon susceptibility for abuse in the fiduciary relationship). 
 78. This theme pervades the literature of fiduciary law and is highlighted in, for example, 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of 
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1754–55, 1782–83, 1785 (2001); Davis, supra note 4, at 4; 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 441; Frankel, supra note 4, at 834; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
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real monitoring (and bonding) device in the fiduciary context,79 courts 
attempt to protect and promote the trust—and make sure it is not betrayed 
too often. The remedies are one way courts signal to parties that they 
should not betray trust; they aim to facilitate a beneficiary’s reliance on the 
trustworthiness of her fiduciary.80 
To be sure, in many contexts, trust accomplishes its objective and 
courts will try not to intrude upon the relationship excessively. For all the 
talk of stringency in enforcing duties in fiduciary law, courts can be 
notably passive and deferential to fiduciaries. But this should not be 
surprising: the entire point of standing in a fiduciary relation to a 
beneficiary is that the fiduciary is supposed to take on a special role of 
judgment, representation, and control.81 Nevertheless, it is just as true that 
trust will facilitate taking advantage of the beneficiary, and accordingly, 
fiduciary law is sensitive to the fragility of trust. 
Another notable feature of fiduciary law is its unapologetic moralism, 
which is revealed through the definition of the relevant relationships, the 
contours of the concomitant obligations, and the imposition of the 
remedies in any given context—apparent already in Meinhard. Although 
parties may usually freely breach their contracts without any sermonizing 
by the courts, breaches of fiduciary duties routinely meet with tones of 
explicit opprobrium and disapproval.82 When considering fiduciary law, 
courts generally write as if they are importing moral requirements into the 
law through their policing of fiduciary relationships.83 “[F]iduciary default 
 
 
Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 597 (2001) (“[W]hen all of the careful analysis [i]s 
said and done, it [i]s obvious that fiduciary obligation is about trust.”); Ribstein, supra note 13, at 217 
(“[F]iduciary duties compensate for the [beneficiary’s] inability directly to observe, evaluate, and 
discipline the [fiduciary’s] performance.”); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2420 (“[M]onitoring the 
quality of the agent’s performance may be difficult. . . . In general, the law characterizes as fiduciary 
those agency relationships in which the principal is particularly vulnerable and unable fully to protect 
and assert his own interests, thus providing the agent a peculiar opportunity and incentive either to 
shirk or cheat.”); Smith, supra note 4, at 1404–06. 
 79. On monitoring and bonding with agents, see Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2421–22. 
 80. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 824. 
 81. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2419–20 (“Satisfactory [fiduciary] performance 
demands considerable decisionmaking discretion . . . .”). 
 82. See Clark, supra note 4, at 75–76; Ribstein, supra note 13, at 237 (acknowledging “strong 
language” in fiduciary duty cases); Stout, supra note 23, at 65 (observing that judicial opinions offer 
“sermons” when applying fiduciary duty law). 
 83. See generally Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1073 (“Disloyalty brings moral 
condemnation. The ponderous language of moral censure in fiduciary cases can wound the 
defendant.”) (footnotes omitted); FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 338 (“Fiduciary relationships and 
fiduciary duties reflect the precepts of social morality . . . .”); Frankel, supra note 4, at 829–30; 
Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1692; Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2425 (“By establishing a standard of 
performance that emphasizes heightened obligations of loyalty and integrity, and by the use of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/3
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is treated as a moral violation with attendant reputational costs.”84 Writing 
in moral terms not only leads courts to draw from the moral sphere and 
“use[] informal social norms to influence fiduciary behavior,”85 but it also 
“arguably help[s] create [and sustain] extralegal norms.”86 It accomplishes 
this latter task by framing for actors what their conduct should be and by 
expressing publicly and symbolically the norms of good behavior. 
To be sure, Judge Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have famously 
argued that fiduciary duties “have no moral footing,” that moralistic 
language appears in plenty of judicial decisions outside the fiduciary 
context, and that a sound theory of the fiduciary concept must focus on 
what courts actually do, not what they say.87 But it remains hard to ignore 
the courts’ own conception of what they are doing when they are 
reviewing claims of fiduciary default. Indeed, even if Easterbrook and 
Fischel are right that a grand unified theory of fiduciary law would need to 
take stock of the actual practices of courts first and foremost, surely 
rhetoric is relevant as well. If courts routinely speak in moralisms in the 
fiduciary context—an empirical observation Easterbrook and Fischel do 
not and cannot contest—that practice furnishes some insight into the legal 
concept under consideration.  
The apparent moralism of fiduciary law is also consistent with the 
general concept identified here: a regime that seeks to support and 
promote extralegal trust to police and monitor opportunism that could and 
does occasionally result from easy access to beneficiary property, 
information, or resources. The reinforcement of social norms through 
moralized rhetoric and haphazard legal intrusion into the moral sphere is 
of a piece with the entire corpus of fiduciary law. Fiduciary law, in fact, 
relies on extralegal, morally altruistic behavior: “in practice [the fiduciary 
duty] rules are open-ended standards that are only imperfectly and 
incompletely enforced by legal sanctions. Nevertheless, we observe a 
relatively high degree of compliance with fiduciary duty rules by U.S. 
corporate insiders” because altruistic and morally-guided behavior is so 
much the background upon which fiduciaries act.88 Further, the 
“invocation of morality may compensate partially for the ineffectiveness 
of market controls in [the fiduciary] context, since beneficiaries are 
 
 
hortatory moral rhetoric, the law invokes a personal sense of moral obligation in the performance of 
fiduciary duty.”).  
 84. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2425. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 237. 
 87. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 427 & 428 n.6. 
 88. Stout, supra note 23, at 47–48. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
686 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:665 
 
 
 
 
presumed less able to protect their interests than are parties in ordinary 
commercial relationships.”89 
It is widely known that “Meinhard’s dictum still seems to be applied 
broadly”90 and that it is, as one commentator colorfully put it, “the oldest 
war-horse in the repertoire of . . . fiduciary duty” with a potent influence 
on fiduciary law.91 But, against this background, does it seem sensible to 
apply the concept of the fiduciary to the friend?  
II. THE FRIEND AND HER LIKENESS TO THE FIDUCIARY 
Some have suggested that we are living in the age of the fiduciary and 
that “we are witnessing the emergence of a society predominantly based 
on fiduciary relations.”92 Indeed, some recognize the fiduciary concept to 
have a “colonizing sway.”93 Perhaps, then, the concept is ripe for 
expansion into other areas of life, where it may be appropriately applied to 
reinforce, sustain, and even create extralegal norms. Although some courts 
stubbornly treat the fiduciary concept as a mere list to be applied to 
particular cases, Ernest Weinrib has written that the “existence of a list of 
nominate relations dulls the mind’s sensitivity to the purposes for which 
the list has evolved.”94 The list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 
As Eileen Scallen has observed, courts have “attempted to formulate rigid 
definitions of fiduciary relationships and the concomitant obligations as 
though these concepts were uniform and unchanging. This may result in 
an ephemeral illusion of certainty and predictability. It also misrepresents 
fiduciary law.”95 
Given the purposes I just highlighted in Part I, here I suggest that 
friends should be more routinely considered fiduciaries for each other. 
Certain parallels between the friend and the fiduciary are easy to see;96 
 
 
 89. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2425. 
 90. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 211. 
 91. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1692–93. 
 92. Frankel, supra note 4, at 802; see also Kenneth M. Rosen, Introduction to the Meador 
Lectures on Fiduciaries, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1041, 1042 (2007) (“Notions of fiduciaries and their duties 
continue to permeate the law. Their importance only continues to grow.”). 
 93. Weinrib, supra note 4, at 1. 
 94. Id. at 5. 
 95. Scallen, supra note 4, at 911. 
 96. For example, much has been written about the fiduciary’s voluntarism—her taking upon 
herself obligations voluntarily rather than their arising through relationships of status. See, e.g., 
SHEPHERD, supra note 4, at 100–01 (focusing upon the fiduciary’s “acceptance” of her role); Frankel, 
supra note 4, at 820–21 (noting that fiduciaries can avoid liability by avoiding the relationship in the 
first place); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1685 n.33 (discussing “the fiduciary’s volition in entering into 
the relationship”); Scallen, supra note 4, at 906 (“Th[e] element of choice—a willing acceptance [by 
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others require more elaboration. In what follows, I focus upon trust, the 
difficulty of monitoring friends, and the possibilities for opportunism 
within friendships, which are all central to the fiduciary concept. Together, 
these parallels counsel for courts to take seriously claims by close friends 
that certain types of betrayals should be treated as breaches of fiduciary 
duties and remediated accordingly. Of course, given the variety of 
fiduciary relationships, duties, and remedies the law recognizes and 
provides—and the reality that fiduciary duties can often be imposed on an 
ad hoc basis97—recognizing friends as fiduciaries as a general matter will 
not tell us very much about how, more specifically, the fiduciary 
relationship of friendship should be policed. Those more specific details 
are deferred until Part III, where I show how the law has already started to 
treat friends as fiduciaries. 
A. Trust and Friendship 
In the first place, we tend to trust our friends especially (perhaps even 
more than we trust our lawyers, whom the law will treat as our 
fiduciaries!). They are our guardians, our counselors, our therapists, our 
managers, our directors, our partners. As I have suggested previously after 
reviewing the lengthy literature on friendship in multifarious disciplines, 
trust is one of the defining attributes of friendship itself: 
Friends tend to be trusting of one another and develop trust through 
private disclosures, sincerity, loyalty, openness of self, and 
authenticity. “What do we tell our friends?” Andrew Sullivan asks. 
“We tell them everything. And we are not afraid of embarrassing 
ourselves or boring each other.” Yet perhaps this view is slightly 
inflated: According to Graham Allan, “While there is a folk belief 
 
 
the fiduciary] of office or specific obligation . . . is essential to the imposition of liability for breach of 
a fiduciary obligation.”); Scott, supra note 70, at 540 (emphasizing the fiduciary’s voluntariness). And 
at the center of the literature on friendship is a focus on the voluntariness of the relationship (in 
contradistinction to relationships of status). See, e.g., Scott Feld & William C. Carter, Foci of Activity 
as Changing Contexts for Friendship, in PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT 136, 136 (Rebecca G. 
Adams & Graham Allan eds., 1998) (calling friendship the “most voluntary type of personal 
relationship”); Allan Silver, Friendship and Trust as Moral Ideals: An Historical Approach, 30 EUR. J. 
SOC. 274 (1989) (emphasizing friendship’s voluntariness). Although this parallel is certainly more 
interesting and important than the fact that fiduciary and friend both start with the letter f, it is not 
distinctive enough to mention in the main text: contractual relations are also quintessentially voluntary 
and rejectable. This may mean that there are important parallels between contracts and friendships 
too—but I will leave that subject for a different paper, provisionally entitled “Friendship as Relational 
Contract.”  
 97. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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that total disclosure is the sign of real friendship, in reality friends 
rarely know everything about one another.” We often withhold 
matters from our friends not because we do not trust them, but 
because we know they are not fundamentally interested in all we 
could share. 
 Perhaps trust is better defined as follows: “Trust is a belief that 
another will fulfill his or her obligations and pull his or her weight 
in [a] relationship. Symbolic gestures and experience create and 
maintain trust.”98 
To be sure, trust undoubtedly occurs between strangers in many 
transactions. Trust at some level is necessary even for arms’ length 
transactions between standard contracting parties (hence good faith 
standards that apply to all?), and “fictive” business friendships with some 
heightened levels of trust are common.99 Indeed, one commentator has 
gone as far as suggesting that “[a] lawyer who deals with contracts and 
fails to understand the power and the limits of trust and the social 
sanctions flowing from ‘fictive friendships’ is incompetent.”100  
Still, friendship furnishes a paradigmatic case of trust and provides an 
important benchmark for how trust can operate in an ideal relational 
context. Without that important model, all relationships of trust might be 
undermined. Humankind needs trust as a foundational good for societal 
organization and survival.101 And “[t]rust is a notoriously vulnerable good, 
easily wounded and not at all easily healed.”102 It thus behooves an area of 
 
 
 98. Leib, supra note 6, at 643 (quoting and citing, respectively, Allan Silver, Friendship and 
Sincerity, 2003 SOZIALERSINN 123, 123; Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett, Friendship and the Self, 
108 ETHICS 502 (1998); ANDREW SULLIVAN, LOVE UNDETECTABLE: NOTES ON FRIENDSHIP, SEX, 
AND SURVIVAL 216 (1998); GRAHAM ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP: DEVELOPING A SOCIOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 107 (1989); 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 230 n.3 (2d 
ed. LexisNexis 2003) (1995)); see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 215 (Terence Irwin trans., 
Hackett Pub. Co. 1985) (noting that trust arises in the highest type of friendships); Silver, supra note 
96 (focusing upon trust and friendship). 
 99. See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973) (arguing that “fictive friendships” 
support most business transactions in the United States: parties use informal modes of address, 
exchange favors and gifts, and act “chummy”); Smith, supra note 4, at 1413–14 (trust exists in 
standard business transactions). 
 100. 1 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 98, at 230 n.3. But see ANNETTE C. BAIER, Trust and 
Antitrust, in MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS 118 (1994) (“Trust in fellow contractors is a 
limit case of trust, in which fewer risks are taken, for the sake of lesser goods.”). 
 101. See BAIER, supra note 100, at 130 (citing 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE 123 ltr. 
81 (E.S. de Beer ed., Oxford: Clarenden Press 1976)). 
 102. Id.  
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law that self-consciously pursues the protection and promotion of trust in 
society to remain sensitive to trust’s paradigmatic case. 
Why is trust—and protecting it—so important? Aside from 
deontological ethical arguments that might stress that trust should not be 
betrayed as a most basic moral requirement103 (and an additional 
argument, of course, that the state must pursue what is moral in the 
fiduciary context), one can emphasize, along with Francis Fukuyama, that 
trust is one of the most important social virtues that can lead a nation 
toward economic development and prosperity.104 If our capitalist economic 
system is one to which our legal system must remain committed, it would 
seem inadvisable to disrupt relationships of trust or fail to find a system of 
preserving, sustaining, and promoting them. Indeed, precisely because 
each economic transaction trades on trust to some degree, debasing trust in 
society by failing to uphold the most basic standards of trust in 
paradigmatic trust relationships would be counterproductive.105 Of course, 
one can become somewhat clichéd and alarmist about this too: “Trust is 
the glue that binds couples, communities, and countries. Societies without 
a sufficient wealth of trust cannot function efficiently, sometimes cannot 
function at all.”106 Thus, a “legal system which neglected commitments of 
loyalty would probably undermine” the economy and its own 
sustainability.107 Still, these pronouncements are more than mere mantra. 
Indeed, Justice Harlan Stone once blamed the Depression on the failure to 
abide by fiduciary law: 
 
 
 103. For such an argument, see Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
199 (1990). In some basic way, Charles Fried’s canonical argument about contract law’s internal 
morality also puts trust at its center. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).  
 Without a real peer in her league, the best philosopher of trust is Annette Baier. Her work on trust 
is collected in BAIER, supra note 100, at 95–202 (containing the essays Trust and Antitrust; Trust and 
Its Vulnerabilities; Sustaining Trust; and Trusting People).  
 104. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY (1995). A similar line of argument is pursued in Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. 
Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 For an important collection of essays on trust, see TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). Adam Seligman actually draws a nice distinction 
between trust and confidence that might be relevant to the discussion here. See Adam B. Seligman, 
Role Complexity, Risk, and the Emergence of Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 619 (2001); see also Niklas 
Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING AND 
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS, supra, at 94, 97. But it would take me too far afield to 
address Seligman’s and Luhmann’s interesting work on the subject. Finally, for some democratic 
theorists’ takes on trust, see DEMOCRACY AND TRUST (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999).  
 105. I discuss the more complicated relationship among friendship, trust, and the economy in 
Leib, supra note 6, at 663–64, 666.  
 106. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 517 (2004). 
 107. FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 341. 
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I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which 
has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes 
and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the 
fiduciary principle . . . . More than a century ago equity gave a 
hospitable reception to that principle and the common law was not 
slow to follow in giving it recognition. No thinking man can believe 
that an economy built upon a business foundation can permanently 
endure without some loyalty to that principle.108 
In a more contemporary milieu, Larry Ribstein also identifies the 
promotion of trust as central to fiduciary law and a prosperous society. He 
highlights that the “disposition to trust is socially valuable because it 
reduces the need for externally enforced constraints, and therefore the 
costs of human interaction. Thus, a society in which trust in this sense 
prevails may be wealthier than one in which it is absent.”109 Or consider a 
slightly different argument presented by Robert Gordon: “[E]ncouraging 
people to deal with one another as strangers progressively erodes the 
underlying relations of solidarity, reciprocity, and trust upon which 
capitalist economies essentially depend.”110 Accordingly, a fiduciary duty 
law that ignores the exemplary trust that friends share risks undermining 
the concept of fiduciary law itself, as well as the legal and economic 
system it is supposed to serve and enrich. 
Thus, the argument here is, at one level, simple (if not overly 
simplistic). Friends, as a category, are paradigmatic exemplars of trust. As 
Immanuel Kant wrote in his Lectures on Ethics, friendship is “man’s 
refuge in this world from his distrust of his fellows.”111 And because 
fiduciary law aims to protect and promote trust, fiduciary law should treat 
friends as fiduciaries.112 But a bit more can be said in favor of treating 
friends as fiduciaries from the standpoint of the fiduciary concept’s 
concern with trust. 
 
 
 108. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1934). 
 109. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 228. 
 110. Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in 
Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 578–79 (citing FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 84–
102 (1976); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 121–63 (1st ed. 1942); 
Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1463 (1982)). 
 111. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 207 (L. Infield trans., 1963). 
 112. To be sure, “[t]rust is not always a good to be preserved. . . . If the enterprise is evil, a 
producer of poisons, then the trust that improves its workings will also be evil, and decent people will 
want to destroy, not protect, that form of trust.” BAIER, supra note 100, at 130–31. What this means for 
a body of law self-consciously pursuing the protection of trust is that certain exceptions need to be 
recognized. Those exceptions fall outside the scope of my general argument here.  
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Another way to think about the concern for trust in the law of fiduciary 
relations is to put the idea in a slightly different, but related, light. Instead 
of seeing the fiduciary relationship as merely a relationship of special 
entrustment, we might focus on the high costs of distrust in fiduciary 
relations. Thus, parties in a fiduciary relationship require high degrees of 
trust and must freely share confidences, secrets, and information for that 
relationship to serve its purposes well. The doctor-patient and attorney-
client contexts are ones where it is obvious that the costs of distrust are 
very high: doctors and attorneys cannot do their jobs well if patients and 
clients are not forthcoming and revealing with them. And neither can 
husbands and wives and partners (whether of the domestic sort or the 
commercial kind) have very good relationships with too much distrust. If 
we think these relationships have social value—and that the law should 
contribute to helping produce and sustain that value—the law must help 
facilitate trust and mitigate the high costs of distrust.  
One way to optimize the fiduciary relationship, then, is to allow resort 
to the legal sanctions associated with fiduciary duties to create a safe 
environment for trust to flourish.113 Because the costs of distrust are too 
high, fiduciaries must be controlled by the law. Potentially more 
important, however, than the actual enforcement of strong duties to target 
distrust and betrayed trust directly is fiduciary law’s “framing” function, 
as Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have called it.114 The gist of this idea is 
that “fiduciary duty rules, and the strong language in judicial opinions 
such as Meinhard, arguably help create extralegal norms.”115 In short, 
fiduciary law is about signaling to fiduciaries that they ought not to be 
self-interested in transactions with and for their beneficiaries; it is 
generative of trust where costs of distrust are especially high. 
Friendship is clearly a setting where costs of distrust are high. For a 
friendship to function properly and to achieve the requisite intimacy to 
enable it to be the source of so much pleasure and dignity,116 friends must 
 
 
 113. This discussion is based on Ribstein, supra note 13, at 228–29. 
 114. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 78 (explaining and elaborating upon “framing” 
theory). 
 115. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 237. 
 116. On intimacy in friendship, see Allan Silver, Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-
Century Social Theory and Modern Sociology, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1474, 1477 (1990) (“Friendship . . . 
turns on intimacy—the confident revelation of one’s inner self to a trusted other . . . .”); see also 
JOSEPH EPSTEIN, FRIENDSHIP: AN EXPOSÉ 40 (2006) (“[O]ne of the things one looks for in a friend . . . 
is the possibility of easy candor in conversation.”); MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Friendship, in THE 
COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 135, 136 (Donald M. Frame trans., 1958) (“Friendship feeds on 
communication.”). On the dignity furnished by friendship, see Leib, supra note 6, at 647, 662, 678 
(citing RAY PAHL, ON FRIENDSHIP 153–54 (2000)). 
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have a reliable trust between them. Friends cannot be friends at all without 
disclosure, authenticity, and openness. Accordingly, it would be beneficial 
for fiduciary duty law to signal to friends the standard of conduct 
appropriate to their setting. To be sure, as Ribstein warns: 
[L]awmakers must carefully choose the conduct they stigmatize. 
The law may be ineffective if it tries to develop a norm that is too 
far removed from existing perceptions of good behavior. Courts 
squander their moral authority by condemning conduct that people 
widely regard as being in the ordinary course of business.117 
Yet friendship is certainly a context in which a norm of “good behavior” is 
reasonably assumed, so stigmatizing the betrayal of close friends hardly 
seems likely to squander a court’s “moral authority.” Indeed, quite the 
reverse may be true: a court may be able to claim its moral authority only 
by not turning a blind eye when close friends betray one another and 
demean friendship itself.118 
B. The Problems of Monitoring and Opportunism in Friendship  
As Part I revealed, the concept of the fiduciary concerns itself with 
something other than mere trust. Although trust clearly sits at the center of 
the concept, fiduciary law also has another related set of preoccupations: 
trying to minimize monitoring costs in contexts where it is very difficult 
for a beneficiary to supervise his fiduciary and policing the consequent 
potential for opportunism. As Kenneth Davis once helpfully put it, 
fiduciary law is in place to avoid having the beneficiary “looking over the 
fiduciary’s shoulder.”119 Friendship, like the classic fiduciary 
relationships, presents a context where monitoring is difficult, leading to a 
high potential for opportunism. 
 
 
 117. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 237. 
 118. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 830 (“Th[e] moral theme is an important part of fiduciary law. 
Loyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic vocabulary.”). Seana Shiffrin has recently taken issue 
with contract law for its divergence from moral norms and its potential for disabling moral agents from 
doing their moral duties. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007). Imagine her potential distaste for a fiduciary law that would so clearly 
depart from our moral norms as to ignore the moral force of our obligations that stem from friendship. 
She should be even more put off by a fiduciary law that fails to recognize friendship than she is by 
contract law. Thus, the “divergence of fiduciary law and friendship,” to play with her title, should be 
even more disconcerting to her because a moral agent will not be able to compartmentalize as easily 
(as she may sometimes be able to do in the context of contract law), given fiduciary law’s self-
conscious infiltration into our moral lives and obligations. 
 119. Davis, supra note 4, at 6. 
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Although courts often write as if there is a clear two-part test for 
finding a confidential relationship—one that requires trust and 
vulnerability, dominance, or influence—a high degree of trust, such as the 
trust between close friends, necessarily leads to a substantial degree of 
vulnerability. As Annette Baier argues, “When we trust we accept 
vulnerability.”120 Indeed, the very concept of trust carries with it some 
degree of vulnerability from the entrustor to the trustee. Baier goes further 
too, foreshadowing my argument here about the friend as a fiduciary:121  
Trust is an alternative to vigilance and . . . trustworthiness is an 
alternative to constant watching to see what one can and cannot get 
away with, to recurrent calculations of costs and benefits. Trust is 
accepted vulnerability to another’s power to harm one, a power 
inseparable from the power to look after some aspect of one’s 
good.122 
Obviously, this account of trust captures an intimate trust, not the 
garden variety trust necessary for parties to a contract.123 The trust in 
Baier’s account is one that can be shared only by people who genuinely 
place their welfare into one another’s hand.124 This kind of entrustment is 
paradigmatically the trust we share with our close friends. Consider this 
view—also Baier’s—that sounds in the tones of fiduciary law quite 
 
 
 120. BAIER, supra note 100, at 132. 
 121. Although much of Baier’s language is (unconsciously?) written in the rhetoric of fiduciary 
law, and, thus, supports some of my argument in this Article, she would likely be very circumspect 
about how I am using her philosophical treatment of trust for my ends. In the final analysis, I cannot 
quite guess what she would think about my argument because although she values trust greatly, she 
might find my efforts to juridify it between friends as excessively “contractarian.” See, e.g., id. at 117 
(“It does not, then, seem at all plausible, once we think about actual moral relations in all their sad or 
splendid variety, to model all of them on one rather special one, the relation between promisor [and] 
promise. We count on all sorts of people for all sorts of vital things, without any contracts, explicit or 
implicit . . . .”). 
 122. Id. at 133. Although she suggests that trust is an alternative to the threat of legal sanctions in 
this quote too, I shall take issue with the “substitutional” nature of trust (for law) in what follows. 
Indeed, fiduciary law is ordered to protect trust precisely by enabling legal sanction for major 
defections. 
 123. Larry Mitchell argues that contracts do not require interpersonal trust at all—only “trust in 
the system itself.” Mitchell, supra note 104, at 196. I think this goes too far. For accounts of contract 
that seems to rely on interpersonal trust beyond trust in “the system,” see FRIED, supra note 103, at 8; 
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004). 
 124. See Mitchell, supra note 104, at 192 (“[I]n a trust relationship, whether because of pragmatic 
reasons . . . or . . . partially pragmatic and partially affective reasons . . . we choose to relinquish some 
of” our “measure of control over the trusted person by contract, or by constant monitoring.”) 
(emphasis added) (citing Annette Baier, Trust and Its Vulnerabilities, in 13 TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES 109, 112 (Goethe B. Peterson ed., 1997); NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 
(1979)). 
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directly: “[T]o trust is to give discretionary powers to the trusted, to let the 
trusted decide how . . . one’s welfare is best advanced, to delay the 
accounting for a while, to be willing to wait to see how the trusted has 
advanced one’s welfare.”125 
What this form of trust between close friends shows—for this kind of 
trust is most evident between such intimates126—is that the concerns of 
fiduciary law with monitoring and opportunism are very much relevant 
between trusting friends. This is especially so because of the broadness of 
the delegation of discretionary authority between close friends. Baier 
again: “The assurance typically given (implicitly or explicitly) by the 
[friend] who invites our trust, unlike that typically given in that peculiar 
case of . . . promise or contract, is not assurance of some very specific 
action or set of actions, but assurance simply that the trusting’s welfare is 
. . . in good hands.”127 In differentiating the paradigmatic case of trusting 
friends from the lesser form of trust between contract partners, Baier gets 
at the heart of why friends are our fiduciaries: 
[C]ases of trust in people to do their job conscientiously and not to 
take the opportunity to do us harm once we put things we value into 
their hands are different from [cases in which we put] trust in 
people to keep their promises in part because of the very 
indefiniteness of what we are counting on them to do or not to do.128  
Thus, Baier connects the core case of trust in a friendship to the 
concerns of fiduciary law: discretionary authority that is difficult to 
monitor or supervise that leads to the ability of the fiduciary to harm her 
beneficiary opportunistically. This difficulty of supervision and 
monitoring stems in some measure from the impossibility of being fully 
 
 
 125. BAIER, supra note 100, at 136. See also id. at 138 (“To trust is to let another think about and 
take action to protect and advance something the truster cares about, to let the trusted care for what 
one cares about.”). 
 126. To be sure, Baier does not limit her theory of trust to trust between friends. Although her 
account is central to my thesis here, I am appropriating her remarks in ways they were not intended. 
For her, the trust of parent and child is as “standard” an example as the trust between friends. Id. at 
147. And she is suspicious of limiting trust to trust between friends (and in families) because such a 
concept of trust would too neatly assume that we can police the distinction between egoistic and 
altruistic motivations. Id. at 155. For theorists who arguably put the trust between friends at the very 
center of the concept of trust itself, see Keith Hart, Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic 
Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 104, at 176, 178; Geoffrey Hawthorn, Three Ironies in Trust, in TRUST: 
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 104, at 111, 112–14.  
 127. BAIER, supra note 100, at 137. 
 128. Id. at 117. 
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clear about what set of actions a friend must take or refrain from taking in 
her role as a friend.  
This last characterization resonates with Easterbrook and Fischel’s 
famous depiction of fiduciary relations as domains in which it would be 
nearly impossible for parties to specify their obligations in a contract 
because the scope of the relationship is too complex and embraces too 
many details about which the beneficiary could not negotiate well.129 
Although some focus on the expertise fiduciaries have in many fiduciary 
relationships to explain why it is hard to form complete contracts with 
them, it is now generally well understood that expertise serves as a proxy 
for a more basic attribute of the relationship: that fiduciaries cultivate their 
discretion on a trust that cannot easily be monitored or supervised and that 
can lead to opportunistic abuse.130  
That this dynamic is typical in friendship cannot be seriously 
questioned. As Baier suggests, with friends, “[w]e have no choice but to 
entrust them with some matters, where constant checking on performance 
is either impractical or undesirable.”131 We cannot always ask our friends 
if they are betraying our confidences: asking such questions, supervising 
our intimates regularly, and raising the prospect of distrust does much to 
degrade trust and to prevent it from forming in the first place. We do not 
specify detailed contracts with our friends because giving them a wide 
berth of discretion is itself an act of friendship. Indeed, it is constitutive of 
friendship not to demand complete preagreement on every detail of 
friendly performance. But for just that reason, it is difficult to supervise 
them. We cannot keep too careful tabs with our friends, since that would 
itself betray intimacy.132  
 
 
 129. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426, 427; see also Cooter & Freedman, supra 
note 4, at 1048 (“In fiduciary relationships . . . the parties are unable to foresee the conditions under 
which one act produces better results than another.”). But see Smith, supra note 4, at 1428–29 (arguing 
that “incomplete contracts are ubiquitous, but fiduciary duties are imposed only in a subset of those 
relationships.”). Smith is, of course, right that the difficulty of fully contracting cannot be the sine qua 
non of the fiduciary relationship, but it is an important factor nevertheless. 
 130. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (explaining that 
expertise often gets inappropriately emphasized instead of the invitation by the fiduciary to trust her in 
a domain where the beneficiary is likely to rely on and be unable to question the fiduciary’s judgment 
or to monitor her activities). 
 131. BAIER, supra note 100, at 139. 
 132. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 236 
(1991) (“Close friends have such a long future ahead of them that they need not worry about minor 
imbalances in the reciprocated favors between them. Therefore, a person who mentions that accounts 
have fallen a bit out of balance indicates either a lack of intimacy or some skepticism about future 
solidarity.”). 
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Of course, the mere possibility for opportunism is a thin reed upon 
which to hang substantial fiduciary duties with unusual remedies. And, 
indeed, in the case of friendship, one might think that there would be a 
very high degree of compliance with the norms of friendship, such that no 
legally enforceable duties would be necessary. Whether because of 
reputational harms that bad friends suffer or owing to the mere power of 
the norms internal to friendship and the personal guilt associated with 
being a bad friend, one might predict a high degree of compliance with 
friendship’s internal morality.133  
Honestly, I have not the faintest clue as to how often friends betray a 
counterpart, leading to a profit or loss that could plausibly be the basis of a 
court action. But given that the court reporters are full of such cases (a 
sample of which will be discussed in Part III),134 compliance is surely far 
from perfect. More importantly, however, a high degree of “extralegal” 
compliance with potential fiduciary norms does not make a decisive case 
against the imposition of legal sanctions, especially in an environment 
where legal enforcement would be imperfect, even if it were available. 
Indeed, it is widely known that corporate fiduciaries demonstrate a high 
rate of compliance, notwithstanding imperfect enforcement of fiduciary 
duties and their inside opportunities for looting and opportunistic 
behavior.135 Thus, there is a role for fiduciary law even in a context in 
which we already see compliant behavior and in which it would be hard 
for the law to do a great job of intervening: 
[I]f we want to encourage individuals to follow imperfectly 
enforced . . . fiduciary duty rules, it might be extremely useful to 
find some person or organization that has the sort of authority . . . to 
“instruct” them that they ought to behave in an other-regarding 
fashion, and to explain exactly which “other” they ought to be 
serving. Interestingly, a number of corporate theorists have 
suggested that this is the role played by the Delaware [courts], 
whose judicial opinions encourage corporate insiders to serve the 
interests of the firm and its shareholders not primarily by 
threatening them with the prospect of personal liability, but by 
 
 
 133. See EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 69 (“Whatever else it has to do with, friendship entails 
obligation—sometimes ample and demanding, sometimes miniscule and subtle, but always, I believe, 
present.”). 
 134. A rough measure: A search in LexisNexis’s “Federal & State Combined” database for cases 
in which “friendship” is a “core term” produced 1,359 case results on December 26, 2007. 
 135. See Stout, supra note 23, at 48. 
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offering “sermons” on the proper deportment of corporate officers, 
directors, and controlling shareholders.136 
Courts could serve the same function in the context of friendship. 
Admittedly, this signaling is somewhat easier to communicate to corporate 
directors, who probably consult lawyers somewhat more often than friends 
do.137 But I doubt it is true that people only learn that the law controls their 
conduct (and, accordingly, conform their conduct to the legal norms) 
through lawyers or legal research. Many of us generally hope the criminal 
law deters crime even though an “average” criminal probably does not 
consult with a lawyer or law books before committing a crime.138 
Something about the justice system’s coercive enforcement mechanisms 
penetrates into society to help members control their conduct. There is 
nothing very mysterious about this either: information about coercion 
trickles down somewhat easily. So even though the signaling the Delaware 
courts can achieve in the corporate context is probably more efficient, 
there is no reason to think that signaling cannot also function properly in 
the friendship context. Indeed, friends probably do consult lawyers in 
many of the sorts of cases to which fiduciary duties would apply. When 
we sell our businesses or our homes to our friends, we may very well get 
lawyers involved. Many of the cases I cite as examples of the friendship-
fiduciary contexts the law has encountered in Part III actually seem like 
ones in which parties would traditionally be represented by counsel. And 
in the hypothetical with which I begin this Article, when David sells out 
John to Daniel for a million dollar consulting agreement, David may very 
well choose to get representation. In these sorts of cases, lawyers would 
better know how to instruct their clients to behave if only courts would be 
consistent about the role of friendship in fiduciary law. Even if courts and 
policy makers ultimately choose not to prefer the cases I do here, some 
more consistent treatment would help all parties plan their transactions 
more reliably. 
 
 
 136. Id. at 65 (citations omitted). 
 137. I thank Brett McDonnell for pushing me on this point. 
 138. But see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral 
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (answering no). Even if the law does 
not deter, there is still the underlying ex post moral rationale for exacting punishment from those who 
breach their fiduciary obligations. And there is the “empirical desert” argument available as well—that 
it breeds general compliance with the law to police conduct that the community agrees “deserves” 
sanction. See generally Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (arguing that 
harmonizing law and social norms can help to breed compliance—and the opposite can breed 
noncompliance); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 
(1997) (same).  
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C. The Friend as a Moral Fiduciary 
Above, I have made my preliminary case for why the friend seems to 
fit comfortably within the legal concept of the fiduciary. There are certain 
objections, of course, which would highlight the misfit between the friend 
and the fiduciary and might show why even if the relationship of 
friendship were to come within the concept of the fiduciary, it would be a 
bad idea to impose fiduciary duties upon friends as a matter of law. I shall 
address some of these objections in Part IV. Yet to come in Part III are 
details about how courts already have come to appreciate the role of our 
friends as legal fiduciaries and more specifics about how the law could 
actually accomplish integration of the friend as a fiduciary. 
But here I pause to make clear a different aspect of my argument about 
treating friends as fiduciaries. Quite apart from what the law does about 
our friendships,139 friendships themselves stand much to gain if friends 
began thinking of their moral duties to one another through the lens of 
fiduciary obligation. Much, of course, has been written in our 
philosophical, literary, and cultural tradition about the relationship of 
friendship.140 However, relatively little has been written about the special 
code of ethics involved in friendship.141 Moreover, even when ethicists do 
write about the morality of friendship, it is usually to question the 
implications such special regard has for universalist moralities or to 
defend the right we have to treat our friends with special care.142 The 
 
 
 139. If the suggestion seems odd, see Leib, supra note 6, for a lengthy defense of my entire 
research agenda in “friendship and the law.”  
 140. I have cataloged and discussed much of this literature elsewhere. See id. at 633–35 nn.9–18, 
674–80. 
 141. But see Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews, What’s the Buzz? Undercover Marketing and 
the Corruption of Friendship, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 2, 9 (2008). 
 142. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM AND MORALITY (1980); TROY A. 
JOLLIMORE, FRIENDSHIP AND AGENT-RELATIVE MORALITY (2001); SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF 
MORALITY 367–68 (1989); David B. Annis, The Meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship, 24 AM. 
PHIL. Q. 349 (1987); Neera Kapur Badhwar, Friends as Ends in Themselves, 48 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1 (1987); Marcia Baron, Impartiality and Friendship, 101 ETHICS 836 
(1991); Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett, Friendship and Moral Danger, 97 J. PHIL. 278, 286 (2000); 
Dean Cocking & Justin Oakley, Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of 
Alienation, 106 ETHICS 86 (1995); John Cottingham, Partiality, Favouritism, and Morality, 36 PHIL. 
Q. 357 (1986); Simon Keller, Friendship and Belief, 33 PHIL. PAPERS 329 (2004); Niko Kolodny, Do 
Associative Duties Matter?, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 250, 250 (2002); Peter Railton, Alienation, 
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 93, 98–99 
(Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988); Sarah Stroud, Epistemic Partiality in Friendship, 116 ETHICS 498 
(2006); Christopher Heath Wellman, Friends, Compatriots and Special Political Obligations, 29 POL. 
THEORY 217 (2001); William H. Wilcox, Egoists, Consequentialists, and Their Friends, 16 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 73 (1987); Neera Badhwar Kapur, Why It Is Wrong to be Always Guided by the Best: 
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presumption of the ethical writing on friendship that exists is that we may 
be partial toward our friends, but it is rare that our ethicists expound on the 
nature and scope of the partiality that can be expected of our friends. 
This Article—by placing fiduciary law and friendship side-by-side—
suggests that we might achieve moral guidance within our friendships by 
taking seriously the “friend-as-fiduciary” model it defends. Consider some 
of the prototypical duties the law imposes upon fiduciaries, enumerated 
and explored in Part I: the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, the duty of 
utmost candor and disclosure, the duty of confidentiality, and the duty of 
good faith and faith dealing. These are, taken together, excellent rules of 
thumb in our interactions with our friends. Even if they are relatively 
nonspecific, they have enough content to guide us and give some contours 
to the nature of friends’ responsibilities to their counterparts.  
We must be unselfish with our close friends, acting in ways that 
promote their best interests. We must affirmatively and diligently aim to 
serve their welfare without negligence. We must be straight with our 
friends and try not to obtain unreasonable advantages at their expense. We 
should not steal business opportunities that come from within the 
relationship. We should not unduly influence our friends to act in a way at 
odds with their interests. We must keep and respect their confidences. We 
must try to avoid conflicts of interest between our personal gain and our 
duties to our friends. And we must deal with our friends fairly, often 
showing them special levels of good faith beyond how we might treat 
strangers. These are deeply important moral guidelines—and although 
they are not terribly controversial, seeing friends as fiduciaries puts in 
clear relief the moral duties we owe our friends. Thinking about our role as 
friends through the lens of fiduciary duties could help us become better 
and more reliable friends.  
Thus, even supposing the friend-as-legal-fiduciary argument fails, there 
is much to be gained by thinking of the friend as a moral fiduciary. As this 
Part has revealed, friends share a paradigmatic form of trust: trust is 
reposed in us as friends, resulting in tremendous vulnerability and 
potential for opportunism.143 Understanding this exposure—an exposure 
 
 
Consequentialism and Friendship, 101 ETHICS 483 (1991); Andrew Mason, Special Obligations to 
Compatriots, 107 ETHICS 427 (1997); Susan Wolf, Morality and Partiality, 6 PHIL. PERSP. 243 (1992). 
 143. I explore many of the personal benefits friendship confers upon its participants in Leib, supra 
note 6, at 654–57 (highlighting friendship’s role in establishing and sustaining our identities, 
confirming our sense of social and moral worth, helping us avoid depression, sustaining our physical 
health, and inspiring creativity). It might be that we owe our friends special fiduciary-like duties not 
(only) for the trust reposed in us and the consequent vulnerability it produces but (also) because of all 
friends do for us in our lives. Still, the friend-as-fiduciary message of this Article helps expose the 
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fiduciary law helps illuminate—might help us be more careful with our 
friendships in our moral lives. This would be no small accomplishment, 
even if legally enforceable fiduciary duties prove too unseemly for the 
friendship context.  
III. THE FRIEND AS A LEGAL FIDUCIARY? 
Unseemly though it may be in theory, in practice courts have 
considered friendship to trigger certain fiduciary duties. It would be 
dishonest, however, not to acknowledge that courts are ambivalent and 
inconsistent about their practices in considering friends as legal 
fiduciaries. In this Part, I first survey the landscape, investigating what 
courts have said and done about treating friends as fiduciaries. I then offer 
a few specific recommendations about how courts ought to analyze cases 
on a going-forward basis in which friends allege a breach of a fiduciary 
duty based upon friendship.  
A. The Law’s Ambivalence About Friends as Fiduciaries 
It is not hard to find cases in which courts disclaim the notion that 
friends are fiduciaries for one another. Wilson v. Zorb144 is as clear as any 
case—and makes the point well because the court went out of its way to 
be explicit about the parties’ “close friend[ship] for many years,” noting 
that they were “intimately associated in social activities.”145 The court 
detailed how often the parties socialized and the nature of their 
relationship, indicating that their personal relationship was distinct from 
their professional relationship (they were both doctors, “consulted” with 
each other, and shared patients).146 Nevertheless, the court rejected the 
claim that the friends stood in a fiduciary relationship to each other: 
Warm friendship, confidence, and an affectionate regard for each 
other were mutual with the parties, and yet each was self-sufficient, 
competent, and independent. . . . Such relationships happily are 
 
 
natural fit between a set of special responsibilities and duties to another and the nature of a trust 
relationship, leading to special vulnerability. See also Gary Chartier, Friendship, Identity, and 
Solidarity. An Approach to Rights in Plant Closing Cases, 16 RATIO JURIS 324, 330, 334–35 (2003) 
(arguing that the core of friendship is vulnerability and that vulnerability creates certain special duties, 
some enforceable by law); Kennett & Matthews, supra note 141, at 9 (“[F]riends are peculiarly 
vulnerable to each other, and this we suggest generates an especially strict moral requirement against 
using one’s close friend as a mere means.”). 
 144. 59 P.2d 593 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936). 
 145. Id. at 594. 
 146. Id. at 596. 
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common, but they are not confidential relationships in a legal sense. 
It takes something more than friendship or confidence in the 
professional skill and in the integrity and truthfulness of another to 
establish a fiduciary relationship.147 
This conclusion is a common one: Kudokas v. Balkus148 and Vargas v. 
Esquire, Inc.149 are somewhat more recent cases that announce a similar 
principle after conceding that the parties at issue were close friends.150 
Perhaps a more radical statement of the principle comes from a 1993 case, 
Silvia Moroder Leon y Castillo v. Keck, Mahin & Cate: “[T]he trusting 
friendship between [a] [p]laintiff[] and [defendant], however strong, does 
not establish a fiduciary relationship.”151 Or, perhaps more explicitly, from 
an 1881 Connecticut case, Hemingway v. Coleman: 
We have before us a contract of sale, the parties to which are of full 
mental capacity; the vendor believes the vendee to be her friend, 
and that the friendship, dating from the time when he served her 
husband as a laborer, has continued unbroken during the seven 
years which had elapsed since that service terminated; and she 
believes him to be honest because of his fidelity. Although friends 
in fact, in law and equity they were strangers and stood at arms 
length in the matter of contract; for friendship is unknown to law or 
equity; in it neither finds any relation involving special confidence. 
 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. 103 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Ct. App. 1972). I discuss this case in Leib, supra note 6, at 688. 
 149. 166 F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1948). I also discuss this case in Leib, supra note 6, at 688. 
 150. See also Bennett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 299, 303 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting a 
longtime friendship as a confidential or fiduciary relationship); Kuper v. Spar, 176 B.R. 321, 329 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding no authority for the proposition that a close friendship between the 
parties could “transform[]” it into a fiduciary relationship for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code); 
Frantz v. Porter, 64 P. 92, 94 (Cal. 1901) (after conceding an intimate friendship between the parties, 
holding that “the relation was neither more nor less than that of warm personal friendship, and there 
can be no presumption, under the facts in this case,” that a fiduciary relationship existed); Butts v. 
Dragstrem, 349 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (“Dragstrem’s primary justification for 
his reliance upon Butts’ representations was . . . their close personal friendship . . . . Unfortunately for 
Dragstrem’s position such a relationship does not create a fiduciary . . . relationship.”); Cranwell v. 
Oglesby, 12 N.E.2d 81 (Mass. 1937) (refusing to find that friendship could establish a fiduciary 
relationship); Kratky v. Musil, 969 S.W.2d 371, 377–79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting claim of a 
“long-time” friend that the friendship established a confidential relationship); Snyder v. Webb, No. 
97APE09-1248, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2776, at * 12 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1998) (same); Bush v. 
Stone, 500 S.W.2d 885, 894 (Tex. App. 1973) (Bissett, J., dissenting) (“Friendship alone does not 
establish a fiduciary relationship . . . .”). 
 151. 873 F. Supp. 12, 15 (S.D. Tex. 1993). Other courts have been just as dismissive. See Neely v. 
Martin, No. C052198, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2322, at *10, *11 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 
2007) (denying that a “20-year friendship” gave rise to a fiduciary relationship, although 
acknowledging that “a confidential relationship may arise from a friendship”). 
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He had not by being a friend become the guardian of her interests in 
any such sense as to impose upon him a legal duty to sacrifice his 
own to theirs.152 
Often, however, courts get more specific in their refusal to recognize 
friendships as fiduciary relationships, rather than relying on broad 
pronouncements about friendship’s immunity from the law. They often 
specify that “mere” friendship—or friendship “alone”—is insufficient to 
trigger a fiduciary relationship. In short, the idea is that friendships can 
exist among the relationships court will consider fiduciary or confidential 
but that the friendship itself cannot be the predicate upon which a fiduciary 
relationship can be established. This idea is routinely expressed by a 
court’s looking for additional evidence of “undue influence” or 
“dominance” within the relationship to trigger the fiduciary duties.153 
But not all courts would be uncomfortable with my attempt here to 
defend the idea that the friend deserves to be treated as a fiduciary. For 
example, Thompson v. Thompson, a 1928 California case, held that 
“[f]iduciary relations are not found solely in those legal relationships, such 
as guardian and ward, husband and wife, trustee and beneficiary, but are 
also found where in fact the relation of trust and confidence exists between 
trusting friends.”154 Other California courts have similarly recognized that 
“friendship, affection, and a close relationship” are sufficient to trigger 
 
 
 152. 49 Conn. 390, 392 (1881). Accord Worobey v. Sibieth, 71 A.2d 80 (Conn. 1949); Wells v. 
Houston, 57 S.W. 584, 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) (“Although friends in fact, in law and equity the 
parties were strangers, and stood at arm’s length in the matter of contract. Friendship is unknown to 
law or equity, and in it, neither finds any relation involving special confidence.”).  
 153. See, e.g., Konja v. Rezai, No. D033904, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5331, at *43 (Cal. 
Ct. App. June 14, 2002) (finding plaintiff to have made up his own mind, so friendship could not be 
predicate for fiduciary relationship); Schultz v. Steinberg, 5 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893–94 (Ct. App. 1960) 
(“In the absence of a showing of the exercise of undue influence mere friendship does not constitute a 
confidential relationship.”); Hausfelder v. Security-First Nat’l Bank, 176 P.2d 84, 87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1946) (same); Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746, 752 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to allow 
friendship to serve as a predicate for a fiduciary relationship); Polletta v. Colucci, No. CV-95-
0125416S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2519 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 1996) (same); Kurti v. Fox 
Valley Radiologists, Ltd., 464 N.E.2d 1219, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Even where a fiduciary 
relationship does not exist as a matter of law, it may nonetheless arise where trust and confidence, by 
reason of friendship, agency and experience, are reposed by one person in another so the latter gains 
influence and superiority over the former. However, the existence of a friendship does not of itself 
establish the existence of such a relationship . . . .”) (citation omitted); Grow v. Ind. Retired Teachers 
Cmty., 271 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. App. 1971) (“A confidential relationship may also arise because of 
personal friendship and when one party knows that the other is relying upon him in such a manner. It 
is essential that there be a dominant and a subordinate party, and . . . that the alleged subordinate party 
was justified in relying upon a relationship of trust and confidence.”); In re Estate of Hill, No. 
99CA2663, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1201 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (refusing to allow friendship 
to serve as a predicate fiduciary relationship); Pfaff v. Petrie, 396 Ill. 44 (1947) (same). 
 154. 267 P. 375, 380 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928).  
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fiduciary obligations.155 Still another California case required of a friend 
that she prove her utmost good faith to her friend, a standard reserved for 
those in fiduciary relationships; the friendship itself served as the predicate 
upon which to base the fiduciary obligation.156 And a California court in 
1972 explicitly wrote, “we have no difficulty in finding a fiduciary 
relationship established . . . by virtue of the long, intimate, personal 
friendship of” the parties.157 
California is not alone in recognizing the friend as a legal fiduciary. 
Courts all over the nation have embraced the idea that a friendship can 
trigger fiduciary obligations;158 certainly, friendship is often listed among 
the relationships that can be considered fiduciary.159 One court even 
clearly specified that the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing 
requires friends to give each other a “fair price” in a transaction between 
friends.160 Two other courts imposed constructive trusts—classic fiduciary 
remedies—over the property of defendants in part because the defendants 
stood in fiduciary relationships to their “close friends,” whose property 
 
 
 155. Rieger v. Rich, 329 P.2d 770, 778 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (“Suffice it to say that the 
evidence clearly establishes that decedent reposed trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of 
both appellants. These are the elements of a confidential or fiduciary relationship.”); see also Ventura 
v. Colgrove, 75 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Ct. App. 1968) (finding friendship to establish a confidential 
relationship sufficient to trigger a duty to disclose); Dalakis v. Paras, 194 P.2d 730, 739 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1948) (finding a friendship to be sufficient to show a fiduciary relationship and to trigger trustee-
beneficiary duties). 
 156. Cox v. Schnerr, 156 P. 509, 512 (Cal. 1916). 
 157. Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 103 Cal. Rptr. 368, 378 (Ct. App. 1972). However, the court 
ultimately furnished the injured party whose confidentiality was breached with fairly modest remedies, 
not a full disgorgement of the profits of the breaching party. 
 158. In Texas, for example, close, personal friendships are central in a court’s consideration of 
whether special fiduciary obligations apply. See Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App. 
1989); Dominguez v. Brackney Enters., Inc., 756 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. App. 1988); Garcia v. Fabela, 
673 S.W.2d 933, 936–37 (Tex. App. 1984); Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d 939, 945–46 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1980); Kalb v. Norsworthy, 428 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Holland v. Lesesne, 
350 S.W.2d 859, 861–62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Texas courts also make a point of distinguishing 
intimate friendships from mere business friendships that receive no special treatment. See Thigpen v. 
Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962).  
 159. See, e.g., Dawson v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 157 N.W. 929, 933 (Iowa 1916) (“The fiduciary 
relation may exist wherever special confidence is reposed, whether the relationship be that of blood, 
business, friendship, or association, by one person in another who are in a position to have and 
exercise or do have and exercise influence over each other.”) (emphasis added). Even the Restatement 
of Trusts acknowledges that confidential relationships are “particularly likely to arise between family 
members or close friends.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b(1) (2003); Brown v. Foulks, 
657 P.2d 501, 506 (Kan. 1982) (“The term ‘fiduciary relation’ has reference to any relationship of 
blood, business, friendship, or association in which one of the parties reposes special trust and 
confidence in the other who is in a position to have and exercise influence over the first party.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 160. Frowen v. Blank, 425 A.2d 412, 417–18 (Pa. 1981) (holding that an elderly plaintiff was 
entitled to a fair price from younger neighbors who befriended her). 
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they misappropriated.161 And another court found a friendship to support 
the duty of good faith and the duty to act “with due regard to the interests 
of the other party.”162 Although most courts will concede that a friendship 
alone cannot trigger the responsibilities of a fiduciary relation, some will 
still acknowledge that friendship “is often an important consideration and 
undoubtedly furnishes a vantage ground for one is not likely to expect a 
friend to deceive him into a bad bargain. As against a friend no shield is 
worn nor sword drawn in defense. Friendship tends to disarm.”163 
These latter set of cases basically adopt the perspective of this Article: 
our close friends should be considered our legal fiduciaries. But one could 
go further in treating friends as fiduciaries: a good friend’s very status as a 
close friend could implicate her counterpart’s vulnerability, such that 
perhaps courts should not need to pursue too carefully a separate second-
stage inquiry about dominance, superiority, or influence. Consider the In 
re Estate of Long approach, a case which gestures toward this further step: 
Mere friendship can result in a fiduciary relationship. “This position 
of superiority may arise by reason of friendship, agency, or 
experience.” . . . Even a capable businessman may repose trust and 
confidence in a friend or associate. Faith and confidence may be 
reposed in a dominant party without entrusting much in the way of 
business and financial affairs to that party.164 
In Long, the court makes explicit that “mere” friendship alone can lead to 
the trust and vulnerability necessary to establish a fiduciary relationship, 
which can, in turn, trigger all sorts of obligations and special remedies for 
their breach.165 Although the determination of a fiduciary relationship 
between friends will always need to remain a fact-based inquiry166 (for 
 
 
 161. Schwartz v. Houss, No. 21741/04, 2005 WL 579152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2005); Cody v. 
Gallow, 214 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1961); see also Klein v. Shaw, 706 P.2d 1348 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1985) (imposing constructive trust to enforce fiduciary duties that were traceable, in part, to 
friendship). 
 162. Perry v. Jordan, 900 P.2d 335, 338 (Nev. 1995). 
 163. Meginnes v. McChesney, 160 N.W. 50, 52 (Iowa 1916); see also Field v. Oberwortmann, 
144 N.E.2d 637, 639–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957) (considering friendship to be a relevant consideration in 
finding parties to be in a fiduciary relationship). 
 164. 726 N.E.2d 187, 192–93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. at 192. But see Schaefer v. Conway, No. 2004AP690, 2005 Wisc. App. LEXIS 937, at *9 
(Wisc. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2005) (“Although it would be wonderful if parents, brothers, sisters, friends, 
and relatives were required to treat each other with the utmost respect and care, and were worthy of the 
trust attendant to such relationships, that is not case.”). 
 166. See Carroll v. Daigle, 463 A.2d 885, 888 (N.H. 1983) (conceding that friendships may be 
found to be fiduciary relationships but deferring to a fact-finder to make the determination as to 
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there are many types of friendships and only a few will implicate the sort 
of trust relationship so central to the fiduciary concept),167 there is good 
reason that courts should not hesitate to conclude that close friendships are 
appropriate contexts in which to enforce fiduciary duties.168 The friendship 
itself, as Long recognizes,169 can be the source of the requisite 
“superiority.”170 
Indeed, some courts, when presented with a transaction that seems to 
have been based in no small part on friendship, hold friends to fiduciary 
duties even if the parties involved were both sophisticated. Thus, even if it 
would be hard to say with a straight face that one friend “dominated” 
another in a given context—a traditional consideration in fiduciary duty 
cases—friendship itself can give rise to fiduciary duties. Consider in this 
regard Gray v. Reeves:171 
A point is made that Mr. Gray was a shrewd and successful business 
man and ought not to have been misled by promises that, when 
revealed in the courtroom, seem to be unreasonable. But [this 
argument] overlook[s] an element which disarms caution; that is, 
friendship. . . . The impulse that leads men to trust those in whom 
they have confidence cannot be ignored by the courts. . . . Hence, 
when men deal as friends and the one accepts that as true which, but 
for the element of friendship, would put a man upon inquiry, the 
law will protect him in his trust as certainly as it will deny him 
 
 
whether the particular friendship between the parties rose to the level of a fiduciary relationship); 
Wheelen v. Robinson, 381 A.2d 742, 745 (N.H. 1977) (same). 
 167. For a typology of different kinds of friendship, see Leib, supra note 6, at 638–52. Some may 
be hesitant to embrace my argument here because I do little in this Article to guide the fact-based 
inquiry about what sorts of friendships should “count.” I have developed a multifactor test elsewhere, 
and it might help courts and fact-finders grow less ad hoc in deciding whether a friendship is close 
enough for fiduciary treatment. Id. at 638–47.  
 168. Courts often recognize that friendship can create a “special relationship,” a prerequisite to 
various other fiduciary-like duties such as the duty to rescue, see Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 
222 (Mich. 1976) (finding that friends may owe one another duties of rescue and including them 
within the category of “special relationships”), and a prerequisite to preclusion of a usury defense by a 
borrower in a loan context, see Hufnagel v. George, 135 F. Supp. 2d 406, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[A] 
‘special relationship’ is limited to a small class of relationships: attorney-client, fiduciary or trustee, or 
a longstanding friendship or its equivalent.”). See also Abramovitz v. Kew Realty Equities, Inc., 580 
N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (estopping a borrower from asserting usury defense owing to friendship 
and special relationship that led to the loan). I discuss Farwell more extensively in Leib, supra note 6, 
at 685–86. 
 169. Accord Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (Ill. 1996) (holding that a 
“position of superiority may arise by reason of friendship”). 
 170. But see Wells v. Houston, 57 S.W. 584, 595 (Tex. Cir. App. 1900) (“No superiority of one 
person over the other can be presumed to exist from the relation of friendship.”). 
 171. 125 P. 162 (Wash. 1912). 
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relief if the personal relations of the parties are such that the dealing 
is at arm’s length. . . . To say that a man who is moved to part with 
his money under such circumstances is to be held at arm’s length is 
to deny sustenance to the very root of society; to make friendship a 
liability instead of an asset.172 
Bush v. Stone is another instance of a court focusing on a friendship to 
create fiduciary obligations, notwithstanding a plaintiff’s experience and 
business sophistication. The majority held the defendant to fiduciary 
standards because the parties “worked together, they had repeated business 
contacts, and were close family-type friends.”173 The court emphasized 
that “the plaintiff and defendant became close personal friends . . . and 
remained as such for . . . 26 years. The plaintiff trusted the defendant the 
same as if he were a member of his own family [and] [t]hey hunted, 
visited, and had repeated social contacts together.”174 The friendship 
supported certain rights for the beneficiary plaintiff, notwithstanding the 
plaintiff’s expertise in the type of transactions at issue.  
Thus, courts have embraced the friend-as-fiduciary model in certain 
contexts and rejected it in others. In some respects, this ambivalence 
should not be surprising, for there are many ways of being friends. Not all 
modalities of friendship raise the concerns with which fiduciary law is 
preoccupied, and the reality of friendship’s many forms virtually requires 
a subtle fact-based analysis in any given friendship presented to a court. 
We do have casual friendships, and it would be unreasonable for the law 
to impose special duties upon us when we are little more than 
acquaintances but do not want to or have not had the occasion to disclaim 
friendship affirmatively. Ultimately, there will always need to be 
something ad hoc about a court’s determination of whether a friendship 
 
 
 172. Id. at 163. To be fair, the court does make something of the fact that one party was “an 
experienced mining man” and “the other, shrewd and successful in the unemotional pursuit of trade, 
but utterly ignorant of mines and mining.” Id. But from the perspective of modern fiduciary law, it is 
notable that both were experienced businesspeople with sophistication and that the friendship was so 
important to the court’s determination. Indeed, in later case law, Washington courts acknowledge the 
continuing relevance of Gray by merely requiring a friendship to be sufficiently close to trigger 
fiduciary duties of disclosure. See, e.g., Hood v. Cline, 212 P.2d 110, 116 (Wash. 1949) (“It is true 
that, in some of our cases, notably [Gray], we have considered that intimate friendship may, under 
certain circumstances, justify one in relaxing the standard of caution he would normally exercise in 
business dealings. But nothing in the record before us shows that the alleged friendship in this case 
was at all close.”); see also Hollerith v. Gardner, No. 49505-4-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 1534, at *9 
(Wash. Ct. App. July 8, 2002) (“We conclude the relationship between Hollerith and Gardner was an 
arms length, professional business arrangement, not the type of friendship that ‘disarms caution’ and 
thereby creates a fiduciary relationship.”) (citing Gray, 125 P. 162). 
 173. 500 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
 174. Id. at 887–88. 
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rises to the level of a fiduciary relationship in any given context and it will 
always be the beneficiary’s burden to put forth clear and convincing 
evidence of the nature of the friendship.175 That is true to the flexibility of 
fiduciary law and to friendship’s variety.  
Notwithstanding the difficulty of making general pronouncements 
about friendship and fiduciary law and how friendship should be 
recognized by courts, however, there are a few more specific guidelines 
that are worth considering to aid courts in integrating the friend-as-
fiduciary idea promulgated here into fiduciary law. As Justice Frankfurter 
famously wrote, “[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it 
gives direction to further inquiry.”176 
B. How To Treat Friends as Legal Fiduciaries 
Here I present five theses that, together, paint a fuller picture of my 
friends-as-fiduciaries proposal. These are mere attempts to be more 
concrete about how to implement the friends-as-fiduciary idea that 
pervades this Article; they are not exhaustive rules. The first, to which I 
have already alluded, is that courts should embrace the idea that close 
friendships should be able to trigger certain fiduciary duties without a 
separate showing of “dominance” or “undue influence.” Second, a 
corollary to the “business judgment rule” (which protects corporate 
fiduciaries from too many suits on the basis of the duty of care) should 
apply in the friendship context as well. Third, the duty of loyalty should 
not be enforced too extremely; it should be the source of policing only 
serious malfeasance, not every minor conflict of interest. Fourth, friends 
should not be presumed to exercise undue influence as a matter of course; 
when friends gift or devise property to their counterparts, the law should 
erect a rebuttable presumption that with friendship comes goodwill. Fifth, 
and finally, the sort of restitutionary remedy that the law should enforce 
between friends when they breach their fiduciary duties should not always 
be a full disgorgement of profit. Rather, courts should be open to 
restitution for contribution, as they are in the context of suit between 
cohabitants. 
 
 
 175. See, e.g., Schrager v. N. Cmty. Bank, 767 N.E.2d 376, 384 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
 176. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943); see also Scallen, supra note 4, at 910 
n.48 (“The disparate evolution of fiduciary obligations provides additional support for the claim that 
labeling someone a ‘fiduciary’ does not charge him or her with the same ‘bag of duties’ and degree of 
obligation imposed on all other categories of fiduciaries.”). 
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1. Close Friends Are Vulnerable to One Another 
As discussed above, some courts have started to appreciate the 
“disarming” nature of close friendship. These courts are on the right track 
and should be emulated. When courts understand that certain types of 
close friendships depend on vulnerability, they will no longer seek any 
additional evidence of vulnerability or inferiority in trusting friendships. 
Because there are many categories of friendship and types of friends, it 
would be implausible to create a presumption that all friends are 
fiduciaries for each other—but courts should be very careful before 
announcing, as so many do, that “mere” friendship cannot serve as a 
predicate for a fiduciary relationship. Courts are far from consistent on this 
point and the survey of the evidence here suggests that friendship can 
serve as predicate for a fiduciary relationship. Further, the normative 
argument here suggests that friendship of a certain kind should be able to 
serve as one; indeed, being true to fiduciary law may require it.177  
To be sure, courts should not lose sight of what they are trying to do 
through their application of fiduciary law and should not thoughtlessly add 
a relationship to the list for rote application. But close friends should not 
be immune from the grip of fiduciary law; their trust in one another should 
be recognized as a paradigmatic form of trust that leads to vulnerability.178 
 
 
 177. There is, to be sure, a risk of circularity here. Ultimately, my proposal is only that certain 
kinds of close friends should be treated as fiduciaries, not that all friends be treated as fiduciaries by 
the law. And I argue here that when courts see examples of these close friends, they ought not pursue 
any further the question of dominance and vulnerability. Yet little in this Article helps explain how 
courts can identify close friends—and one reasonable conclusion might be that courts need to rely on 
the old trust and vulnerability tests fiduciary law already uses. 
 Indeed, this Article does little to address this issue because from the very start it brackets how to 
identify and characterize friendships. See supra note 6. Nevertheless, I have already written a more 
general article about friendship and the law, which undertakes some of this ground-clearing work. See 
Leib, supra note 6, at 638–53. Utilizing the multifactor test for friendship I develop elsewhere, courts 
can conclude that a relationship calls for fiduciary treatment without resort to inquiries into 
vulnerability and dominance. And even if they continue in assessing vulnerability and dominance, I 
am hopeful that I have made the case here that close friendships are actually paradigmatic on that score 
and should not be discounted or immunized from such an analysis. 
 178. But see ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 240, 234 (observing that when close friends trust each 
other, the law should not intervene: “[S]ome cities do not allow legal actions . . . but think that people 
who have formed an arrangement on the basis of trust must put up with the outcome.”). I explore 
Aristotle’s discussion of the law’s relationship to friendship in Leib, supra note 6, at 652–53. See 
generally infra Part IV for an assessment of the “crowding thesis.” 
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2. A “Friendship Judgment Rule” 
Beyond the guidance the friends-as-fiduciaries idea can offer in 
identifying fiduciary relationships, it can also help recommend the specific 
duties that should flow from the relationship. As I highlighted earlier, the 
panoply of fiduciary duties is implemented variously (in scope and 
substance) depending on the relational context.  
In the corporate law context, where the enforcement of fiduciary duties 
is relatively lax (relative to the trustee-beneficiary context, for example), 
corporate fiduciaries are presumed to have performed their duties of care 
with due diligence.179 This presumption is enshrined in “the business 
judgment rule,” which is “a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the company.”180 As summarized by Professors Scott, “[t]he business 
judgment rule represents an implicit recognition that the more complex 
and broad ranging is the fiduciary relationship, the more discretion is 
needed and the more legal norms must be selectively deployed in concert 
with other informal arrangements that also align the interests of the 
parties.”181 
In enforcing a friend’s duty of care, it seems that the parallels with the 
corporate law context warrant an analogous “friendship judgment rule.”182 
Friends have extremely complex and broad-ranging relationships: the 
duties of friendship are always underspecified and can always shift from 
 
 
 179. Fiduciary law also will presume fairness and a conflict-free transactional environment—
leading to upholding interested transactions by the fiduciary—so long as the fiduciary can show 
certain forms of procedural fairness. See Mitchell, supra note 104, at 186, 189–90 (highlighting the 
“fairness doctrine” in the fiduciary context and arguing that it erodes trust and community). In the 
friendship context, however, it is quite hard to imagine what “procedural fairness” would look like. It 
is much more plausible to proceed case-by-case in assessing fairness, rather than using presumptions 
won through procedures. 
 180. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), cited in Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 
2423–24 & 2424 n.77. 
 181. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2424. Mitchell concurs with this understanding of the business 
judgment rule in Mitchell, supra note 104, at 192, and also emphasizes, beyond complexity, the 
difficulty of assessing the “truth” about appropriate conduct in corporate enterprises. I suspect it is 
largely true of friendship too that the truth of proper friend behavior is elusive and difficult to ascertain 
with certainty.  
 182. Two other common rationales for the business judgment rule—that it induces risk taking and 
that it protects the value of centralized decision making—have no obvious application in the friendship 
context. In fact, they highlight the limits of the “friendship judgment rule” that I delineate here 
precisely because we might very well want to promote less risky behavior when it comes to our 
friendships and to discourage unilateral decision making. Thanks to Gordon Smith for appropriate 
skepticism about these issues. 
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under our feet. Friendships themselves are always organic, always in 
motion, and always responsive to shifting realities. It is impossible to be 
too exacting about what would count as meeting or violating a relevant 
duty of care; the discretion friends need recommends deferring to the 
judgment of friends unless departures from good behavior are manifest.  
Obviously, there is a danger that the exception of a friendship judgment 
rule might swallow the whole range of fiduciary duties that this Article 
seeks to have imposed upon friends. It would be a hollow victory for my 
agenda here if the enforcement of fiduciary duties in the context of 
friendship mirrored the pattern we see in corporate law with very feeble 
enforcement.183 But aspects of the duty of candor, the duty of 
confidentiality, the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing, and the duty 
of loyalty would remain enforceable, a friendship-judgment rule 
notwithstanding. Even the duty of care could be found to be violated at the 
extreme. In any case, as one court memorably put it, at “the heart of a . . . 
fiduciary’s duty is an attitude, not a rule.”184 And fiduciary law needs a 
reorientation of its set of attitudes to be more sensitive to the fragility of 
trust within friendships and to do its part to help sustain and promote trust 
between friends. 
3. Being Loyal to Friends 
The duty of loyalty can be enforced very rigorously, allowing courts to 
void all “interested” transactions and enabling courts to sanction any 
fiduciary that does not always put her beneficiary’s welfare as a first 
priority.185 But it can be enforced more selectively too, having courts focus 
mainly on bad acts of the fiduciary, on whether a fiduciary has 
misappropriated opportunities that came to her on account of her status as 
a fiduciary, on egregious self-dealing without consent of the principal, and 
on unconsented-to competition with a principal.186 This latter set of foci of 
enforcing the duty of loyalty makes more sense in the context of 
friendship.  
The blurry lines within the morality of friendship that provide us with 
only schematic guidance about how far we have to go to pursue our 
friends’ best interests—must we give them all the market information we 
 
 
 183. I thank Reza Dibadj for pushing me on this issue. 
 184. Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
 185. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (the duty of loyalty necessitates 
a fiduciary to act solely in the interest of the beneficiary). 
 186. See generally FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 321–74 (2000). 
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have at our disposal when we are competing for the same jobs?—suggest 
that it would be very hard to require friends to be fully altruistic.187 Indeed, 
a “despotism of virtue”188 might draw fiduciary law too far away from the 
moral standards of conduct that give it its authority. Accordingly, a more 
flexible and less stringent form of the duty of loyalty to govern friendships 
is probably warranted.  
There is also a neat analogy between friendship and the close 
corporation context that counsels for less stringent enforcement of the duty 
of loyalty in the friendship context. As Lawrence Mitchell argues, in close 
corporations courts tend to employ “remedial approaches which focus on 
the putative fiduciary’s wrongful conduct” rather than on “prophylactic 
fiduciary principles to prevent or resolve intra-corporate conflicts” or on 
“the beneficiary’s best interests.”189 The reason the application of the duty 
of loyalty applies with somewhat less intensity in close corporations has to 
do with the structure of ownership and control in that context:  
The problem burdening fiduciary analysis in the law of close 
corporations is that those considered fiduciaries in close 
corporations are not, in fact, disinterested. They generally own 
significant, if not controlling, amounts of the corporation’s stock. 
Thus, the fiduciary shares with the beneficiary a legitimate claim to 
the “trust” property over which she has exclusive control.190  
Friendships share something in common with closely held 
corporations. From one perspective, the “trust” property could be 
considered the friendship itself, in which both parties have a critical 
investment. Although somewhat counterintuitive, one can see that in the 
context of a breach of a fiduciary duty of friendship part of what has been 
misappropriated—the thing over which the friend fiduciary has 
discretionary control—is the substance of the friendship.  
 
 
 187. In considering why friendship cannot be deemed purely altruistic, Annette Baier asks: “Is our 
will to sustain friendships to be decreed egoistic to the extent that our concern for our friends is for 
ones who are ‘second selves’ to us?” BAIER, supra note 100, at 156. The idea of friends as “second 
selves” is a dominant theme in the friendship literature. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 260 
(“[A] friend is another . . . self.”); DE MONTAIGNE, supra note 116, at 141, 143 (arguing that friends 
are of “one soul in two bodies,” that they maintain a “fusion of . . . wills,” and that friends are a 
“second self”). I discuss the potentially narcissistic elements of friendship in Leib, supra note 6, at 
672–74. 
 188. The phrase is Roberto Unger’s (though he applies it to a law of fiduciaries that would force 
us to treat all our contract partners with heightened levels of solidarity and altruism). See Unger, supra 
note 7, at 641. 
 189. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1676. 
 190. Id. See also Mitchell, supra note 104, at 190 (discussing fiduciary law in the close 
corporation context).  
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Even if this lens onto the friend-as-fiduciary model is too distorting, the 
parallels still work in the context of jointly formed business opportunities 
or business-related confidences within a friendship. Take the example with 
which I began: John and David’s business plan, in which both had a stake, 
was entrusted to David, who potentially misappropriated it by selling it to 
Daniel without sharing proceeds with John.  
Seen from these perspectives, friends stand in the same relationship to 
the friendship as owner-directors in closely held corporations stand to 
other shareholders. Accordingly, it may be appropriate, as in the closely 
held corporation context, to “require proof of some form of affirmative 
bad faith or intentional misconduct by the fiduciary.”191 As Mitchell 
writes: 
By shifting the inquiry from the beneficiary’s best interests to a 
more limited focus on the fiduciary’s malfeasance, these tests 
provide greater latitude than do traditional fiduciary principles for 
. . . fiduciaries to pursue their own interests, and diminish the power 
of the law to inspire and enforce high standards of business 
ethics.192 
To be sure, Mitchell sees the relaxation of the duty of loyalty in the 
closely held corporation context as violative of the very foundations of 
fiduciary duty law’s desire to force corporate insiders to behave in ways 
different from the mere “morals of the marketplace.”193 But such a 
relaxation of the duty of loyalty in the friendship context—if it can be 
properly called a relaxation—should not erode any of the animating 
purposes of fiduciary duty law. This is so because the focus on 
malfeasance and bad faith in the friendship context will not be 
circumscribed by the “morals of the marketplace;” the standards of good 
faith and proper behavior will come not from the marketplace but from 
ethical life more generally. The background and baseline are not the 
marketplace but the love of friends. 
4. Giving Friends Their Due 
There is at least one area in the law of fiduciaries where it seems 
inadvisable to treat the friend as a fiduciary: in the law of gifts and wills. 
 
 
 191. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1677.  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1680–82 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] FRIENDS AS FIDUCIARIES 713 
 
 
 
 
And, indeed, some courts have also recognized this exception to treating 
friends as fiduciaries. 
In the law of gifts and wills, when fiduciaries are named as donees in 
transactional contexts in which they take part,194 they are traditionally 
required to prove that they have not unduly influenced the donor or 
decedent in her choices about how to dispose of her property. The burden 
of proof falls immediately upon the fiduciary-donee to make a showing of 
utmost good faith and to prove an absence of undue influence.195 If the law 
more broadly embraced the friend-as-fiduciary model, it would likely 
become much more difficult for donors to gift or bequeath property to 
their friends. This result may be perverse, so any more systematic effort to 
recognize the friend as a fiduciary should remain mindful that the 
fiduciary burden of proof in the gift and will context should probably not 
apply to friends, where good faith gift giving seems common.196 
As it turns out, some courts have already recognized that preventing 
friends from taking under a gift or will makes little sense, fiduciary law 
notwithstanding. Indeed, sometimes courts will allow a friend to take a gift 
or bequest without a requisite showing of utmost good faith and an 
absence of undue influence,197 even if the donee and donor are in an 
established formal fiduciary relationship. For example, consider this 
pronouncement of a Massachusetts appellate court in Markell v. Sidney B. 
Pfeifer Foundation, Inc.: 
Not infrequently an attorney will draft a will or do estate planning 
work for a relative or close friend and associate; and in such a case, 
if the attorney or a member of his immediate family is named as a 
[donee], a court called upon to examine the transaction, although it 
may suggest that the better practice would be for an independent 
attorney to do such work, and although it may state that such a 
transaction should be viewed with great circumspection, will not 
apply to such a transaction the presumption of impropriety which is 
 
 
 194. I avoid calling fiduciaries set to take under a will or gift “beneficiaries” for obvious reasons 
in this context: it might confuse readers because the relevant assumption here is that the donee (or, 
beneficiary of the gift or will) is a fiduciary to the donor, herself a beneficiary of the fiduciary. 
 195. See, e.g., In re Estate of Long, 726 N.E.2d 187, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); In re Estate of 
Moretti, 871 N.E.2d 493, 494 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
 196. For the general argument about why the law ought to promote friendship (quite apart from 
the relationship between the friend and the fiduciary), see Ethan J. Leib, Friends and the Law: Can 
Public Policy Support the Institution of Friendship?, 145 POL’Y REV. 55 (2007). 
 197. In re Wharton’s Will, 62 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (App. Div. 1946) (“Gratitude, esteem or 
friendship which induces another to make testamentary disposition of property cannot ordinarily be 
considered as arising from undue influence and all these motives are allowed to have full scope 
without in any way affecting the validity of the act.”). 
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applied when dealing with one whose fiduciary status is 
uncomplicated by ties of . . . close friendship.198 
The court even furnishes a reason for this differential treatment of those in 
fiduciary relationships (and double fiduciary relationships from the 
perspective of the friend-as-fiduciary model, to boot): 
The reason for the distinction is that, in the case of an exclusively 
fiduciary relationship, it can reasonably be presumed that that 
relationship influenced the transaction; and the policy of the law is 
to favor the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty and to discourage business or 
donative transactions which inure to the personal benefit of the 
fiduciary. But where there is also a relationship of . . . friendship, 
gifts or other acts of generosity are natural and to be expected; in 
such a setting the reason for the presumption of impropriety 
dissolves.199 
Thus, friendship can provide a reason for generosity, such that gifts and 
bequests between friends should not be held to the strict standards of other 
attorney-fiduciaries.200 These latter parties must show utmost good faith 
and an absence of undue influence. Otherwise, their gifts and bequests will 
be invalidated as a matter of law.  
To be sure, not all courts agree that a close friendship in an otherwise 
fiduciary relationship is sufficient to shift the burden of proof of undue 
influence back to the contestant rather than it being laid squarely upon the 
fiduciary to rebut a presumption of undue influence.201 Indeed, Cleary v. 
 
 
 198. 402 N.E.2d 76, 94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (internal quotation and citations omitted). The court 
draws from other cases in which long-standing friendships were held to immunize a formal fiduciary 
from inquiry into undue influence. See id. at 95 (citing Slater v. Munroe, 55 N.E.2d 15 (Mass. 1944)).  
 199. Id. (citations omitted). In Markell, however, the fiduciary was a “triple” fiduciary (a lawyer, a 
nephew, and a manager of his aunt’s financial affairs) and was ultimately held to have unduly 
influenced the donor and taken advantage of her confidences.  
 200. See In re Crissy, 826 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 2006) (allowing a lawyer of a testator to plead 
a “pre-existing friendship” to explain a bequest and avoid the scrutiny to which he might have 
otherwise been subject in probate); In re Estate of Smith, 411 P.2d 879 (Wash. 1966) (holding that 
friendship explained a gift in a will to an attorney-fiduciary); In re Estate of Tank, 503 N.Y.S.2d 495, 
497 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) (“If the attorney is a relative or friend of the decedent with a long-standing 
relationship of friendship, the objective, rational basis of the gift is explained and the bequest allowed 
to stand.”) (citing Matter of Arnold, 479 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sur. Ct. 1983); Matter of Annesley, 412 
N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sur. Ct. 1979)); In re Wharton’s Will, 62 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (“[T]he burden of proof on 
[the issue of undue influence] does not shift but remains on the party who asserts its existence,” even 
where the principal beneficiary was the testatrix’s own attorney, who was a family friend and drafted 
the will). 
 201. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Chandos, 504 P.2d 524 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that 
donees who were friends with and living with infirm donor were guardians and fiduciaries of the 
donor, so donor’s gift deed gave rise to a presumption of constructive fraud). 
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Cleary, a more recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, flatly rejects Markell, and holds that a “close relationship 
[of friendship] should [not] shift the burden of proof back to a 
contestant.”202 Still, even if it remains true (in Massachusetts, anyway) that 
a formal fiduciary who is also a friend will still be subject to the 
traditional fiduciary burden to rebut the presumption of undue influence, 
the Cleary court simultaneously leaves open the possibility that, at least 
for the purposes of gifts, trusts, and wills, a “friend is not usually a 
fiduciary, and therefore the ordinary burden of proof applies.”203  
Although it is likely that courts following Cleary would be required to 
hold the friend to the special burden of the fiduciary if the law more 
generally recognized the friend as a fiduciary,204 one could still 
disaggregate the general demarcation of a fiduciary relationship in 
friendship and its attendant consequences. As I described earlier, calling a 
relationship fiduciary does not generally mean that a standard set of duties 
always applies. Rather, the law should allow our friends to receive gifts 
and bequests in transactions in which they take part without having the 
burden of proof to show their good faith and to rebut a presumption of 
undue influence.205 Giving gifts is so quintessentially central to 
friendship206 that it makes little sense to have the law look upon such gifts 
with any special suspicion.207  
 
 
 202. 692 N.E.2d 955, 959 (Mass. 1998). 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 961 (“[T]he burden of proof is on the fiduciary.”). 
 205. Even Massachusetts courts have expressed skepticism of Cleary. See Rempelakis v. Russell, 
842 N.E.2d 970, 977 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (“Fiduciaries are often relatives or friends of the principal, 
and thus frequently are natural objects of the principal’s bounty. Indeed, it is the principal’s feelings 
for the fiduciary that many times result in both the choice of that individual to perform fiduciary 
functions and the desire to reward the fiduciary in some manner. We think it a peculiar proposition that 
this natural state of affairs should be presumed in all instances to be the product of sinister behavior on 
the part of the fiduciary unless he proves otherwise.”). Indeed, it is routine to find fiduciaries to be 
engaging in undue influence when they isolate donors from close friends, who are presumed to have 
the donor’s best interest at heart. See, e.g., In re Estate of Moretti, 871 N.E.2d 493, 495, 500–01, 503 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
 206. See Leib, supra note 6, at 645 (citing Jack L. Carr & Janet T. Landa, The Economics of 
Symbols, Clan Names, and Religion, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 156 (1983); Janet T. Landa, The Enigma 
of the Kula Ring: Gift-Exchanges and Primitive Law and Order, 3 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 137, 152–
56 (1983); Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 
567, 568 (1986); ELLICKSON, supra note 132, at 167, 176–78, 235–36; MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: 
THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., 1990)); see also 
Schwartz v. Garrett, 91 P.2d 535, 536 (Or. 1939) (“[I]t is a natural human instinct to reward friendship 
and acts of kindness.”). This view should resonate with some classic sociological and social 
psychological perspectives on the gift. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM 
HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 212 (1971) (discussing gifts as “creative altruism,” helping us 
realize ourselves through donating to others); Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of the Gift, 73 
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5. Restituting Friends 
Just as in cases of garden-variety breaches of fiduciary duty, there can 
be no singular off-the-rack remedy when it comes to remediating breaches 
of the fiduciary duties of friendship. “Restitution” is the broad name we 
give to the equitable remedies for breaches of fiduciary duties. But, as I 
suggested earlier, restitution comes in many forms and is not the exclusive 
remedy for breaches of fiduciary duties.208 In some cases, a constructive 
trust over some property seems to be the right remedy. In other cases, a 
more thorough disgorgement of all profits seems more appropriate. But in 
some cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, the only remedy might be 
rescission or invalidation; and in other cases of more egregious conduct 
breaching fiduciary duties, punitive damages might be awarded. 
Sometimes simply paying a fair price might be sufficient to remedy a 
conflicted transaction. And in the area of securities regulation, breaches of 
the duty of confidentiality through misappropriation of material, nonpublic 
information leads to both civil and criminal penalties.209 Accordingly, it 
 
 
AM. J. SOC. 1 (1967) (discussing the gift as, inter alia, a generator of identity and as a way to 
encourage reciprocity and behavior). 
 207. Indeed, until very recently California recognized a “pre-existing friendship” exemption to its 
custodial care provisions, CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (2008), which trigger the fiduciary burden of 
proof every time a gift or bequest is made to someone who cares for a donor or decedent. See In re 
Conservatorship of Estate of McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10 (Ct. App. 2004) (friends should not need 
to rebut a presumption of undue influence merely because they provide custodial care); In re 
Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Ct. App. 2003) (same). In 2006, however, 
California abrogated the friendship exemption and now holds that friends who care for donors or 
decedents will probably be subject to the fiduciary standard of proof even if they did not help to 
prepare the gift or bequest instrument. See Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196 (Cal. 2006). For limitation 
on the standard in the case of attorneys, see Rempelakis, 842 N.E.2d at 977. For a recent analysis, see 
generally Leib, supra note 6, at 697–99; Kirsten M. Kwasneski, Comment, The Danger of a Label: 
How the Legal Interpretation of “Care Custodian” Can Frustrate a Testator’s Wish to Make a Gift to 
Personal Friend, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 269 (2006).  
 208. See supra Part I.C. 
 209. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated to give it effect prohibit “misappropriat[ion of] 
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the 
information”). For an argument that friendship should routinely be held to be a confidential 
relationship for the purposes of misappropriation liability under the securities laws, see Ray J. 
Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal Relationships as a Basis for Insider Trading 
Violations, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 467, 493 (2002) (concluding that “[t]he SEC should abandon any 
inquiry into the quality of relationships with family members and friends, and should simply conclude 
that they all involve relationships of trust and confidence” for the purposes of misappropriation 
liability); Leib, supra note 6, at 692–94. Obviously, the friend-as-fiduciary model has ramifications for 
securities law; this is not the place to explore them in detail. I should say that I have grown less 
enthusiastic about using the criminal law to preserve and promote friendships, at least without more 
formal entry mechanisms into such relationships. See generally Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib, & 
Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
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would not be sensible to focus on any particular remedy as the remedy 
appropriate to breaches in the context of friendship. 
But there is one form of restitution that might be recommended more 
broadly, even if it will not fit well with every case. In particular, Hanoch 
Dagan’s discussion about “restitution in contexts of informal intimacy” 
helps identify a particularly appealing form of remedy when a friend 
breaches her fiduciary duties to her counterpart: contribution-based 
restitution.210 Dagan sees this as an especially useful remedy for the “legal 
facilitation of relationships of long-term reciprocity” characterized neither 
by “sheer pursuit of self-interest” nor pure “acts of good-samaritanism.”211 
His vision links with a larger claim about the law’s promotion of a “liberal 
vision of community,” in which citizens are encouraged voluntarily to 
identify with people who share their values and ways of life in order to 
maintain self-respect and a sense of being “at ease in the world.”212 
Because friendships fit the bill—they are voluntaristic long-term 
relationships of reciprocity that are neither fully altruistic nor egoistic and 
they are sources of solidarity and identity213—Dagan’s preferred remedy 
may be a useful guide in remediating breaches of the fiduciary duties of 
friendship. 
Dagan’s particular form of restitutionary remedy that might be useful 
in adjudicating allegations of breaches in the friendship context arises 
most clearly in cohabitation cases, one of which also presents as a 
friendship case of a sort. Dagan’s recounting of the tale of Frambach v. 
Dunihue214 sets the stage. A widower with seven children and a couple 
with four children became close friends—so close, in fact, that they decide 
to cohabit with their families over a nineteen-year period. Eventually, one 
party asked the other to leave their joint home (though there is little 
indication in the record for why the friendship came to a sudden end). 
Although the trial court decided that the families and friends should share 
 
 
 210. See generally DAGAN, supra note 55, at 164–209. Not everyone in the legal academy has 
been impressed with Dagan’s discussion in this part of his book. See Mark P. Gergen, A Thoroughly 
Modern Theory of Restitution: The Law and Ethics of Restitution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 173, 183–89 (2005) 
(book review). But its normative thrust is relevant here, even if one wishes to reject Dagan’s specific 
forms of implementing contribution-based restitution. 
 211. DAGAN, supra note 55, at 164. 
 212. Id. at 164–65. Dagan’s more general claims about restitution as a remedy seem relevant as 
well: Restitution “facilitate[s] informal intimate relationships by protecting interpersonal relationships 
of reciprocity, trust, and reliance, and shielding the parties to such relationships against the lingering 
risks of opportunism and abuse of trust.” Id. at 165. 
 213. I show how friendship meets these criteria for liberal community elsewhere. See Leib, supra 
note 6, at 642–47, 653–62. 
 214. 419 So.2d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
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the property’s value down the middle, the appellate court took an approach 
common to the cohabitation context (when there is no contract between 
the parties that otherwise controls asset distribution upon break-up): 
contribution-based restitution.215 That is, the respective families were 
awarded a “share” of the joint home, in proportion to how much each 
family put into creating the value. Dagan warns us that it would be hard to 
see the contribution-based restitutionary remedy as the majority position—
plenty of courts treat cohabitants as essentially married, splitting property 
down the middle, while many other courts essentially try to deter “living 
in sin” by refusing to make any equitable distributions.216 Still, Dagan 
demonstrates that it is a common and desirable “middle-of-the-road” 
approach.217 
Dagan identifies and endorses a set of normative rationales for 
contribution-based restitution in the cohabitation context that might apply 
between friends. First, he sees those engaged in informal intimacies as 
falling somewhere “between spouses and strangers.”218 Accordingly, he 
believes that the doctrinal structure should support that situation, affording 
those in informal intimacies more protection than the law would give to 
strangers, who receive nothing other than their contractual entitlements, 
and less protection than spouses, who he thinks should receive half of an 
estate to reflect the altruistic aspirations of marriage.219 It is certainly not 
hard to see friendships as similarly resting between spouses and strangers, 
counseling for similar treatment. 
Second, Dagan explains a detail about the administration of the 
contribution-based restitution remedy: it measures only benefits that fall 
outside “the ordinary give-and-take of a shared life.”220 This limitation 
enables those in long-term reciprocal relationships to avoid keeping tabs in 
the day-to-day services the parties provide for one another and enables 
courts to stay out of intimacies to some reasonable extent. The focus of 
contribution-based restitution, then, is upon substantial investments of 
time, energy, or money into a partner’s business or assets.221  
 
 
 215. The case—along with other contribution-based restitution cases in the cohabitation context—
is discussed in DAGAN, supra note 55, at 165–68. 
 216. Id. at 167. 
 217. Id. at 167–68 (citing cases). Dagan discusses and cites the states that seek to deter 
cohabitation in id. at 180–83. 
 218. Id. at 171. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1400 (2001). 
 221. See DAGAN, supra note 55, at 172. 
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One can easily see here as well why this type of remedy might usefully 
guide the law of the friend-as-fiduciaries. Certainly, no one wants broken 
friendships to lead to litigation as a matter of course; the idea of people 
suing their ex-friends for the value of their ordinary services as friends 
sounds preposterous. Focusing on substantial benefits that can be 
restituted through a contribution-based remedy seems appealing to limit 
the number of suits courts will need to consider and to give effect to the 
reality that much that we do for our friends is gratuitous—and should 
remain so (for all the reasons gifts should be encouraged and facilitated 
between friends).  
As Dagan helpfully puts it in defending contribution-based recovery’s 
consonance with the values of liberal community: 
On the one hand, setting the threshold at the level of [substantial] 
benefits rejects the strict . . . accounting that applies in other social 
settings, thus refusing to reduce the [intimates’] relationship to 
monetizable exchanges, seeking instead to preserve and inculcate 
their sense of mutual responsibility. On the hand, by limiting the 
degree of acceptable asymmetrical benefits . . . such a regime takes 
proper account of the limits of solidarity and the dangers of 
opportunism.222  
Thus, to avoid commodification—certainly a potential danger if the 
friend is to be treated as a fiduciary with enforceable obligations—the 
remedy must attempt both to reinforce community and to provide a 
mechanism to check opportunism. This availability for “an anti-
opportunistic device . . . can reassure prospective parties that they will not 
be abused for cooperating” and may inspire “willingness to cooperate 
without focusing on the grave vulnerability that such trust can 
engender.”223 Dagan plausibly argues that contribution-based restitution is 
equal to the task224—and, accordingly, perhaps it should be considered 
more widely within the friendship context when courts are presented with 
breaches of attendant fiduciary duties.225 To use the hypothetical with 
 
 
 222. Id. at 173. Dagan prefers “extraordinary benefits.” My instinct is that this rhetoric gives 
courts too much reason to refuse recovery so I prefer to use a “substantial benefit” test. 
 223. Id. at 175. 
 224. Dagan also helps articulate why a “no-remedy” regime, where friends cannot sue one another 
for breaches of trust, is unacceptable: “While seemingly utopian, the no-remedy regime is likely to 
yield detrimental consequences in our non-ideal world. Long-term interpersonal relationships in liberal 
environments are particularly vulnerable to opportunistic behavior because of the liberal commitment 
to free exit, which is (correctly) perceived as a prerequisite to a self-directed life.” Id. at 174. 
Obviously, this cautionary note supports the entire argument of this Article. 
 225. Dagan further distinguishes between two formulas of the remedy—one that compensates the 
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which I began, John might sue David not for a full disgorgement of his 
one million dollar contract on account of his potential bad faith, potential 
breach of a duty of confidentiality, and a potential misappropriation of a 
“corporate” opportunity, but rather for a restitutionary remedy based upon 
his contribution to the idea and its development; the recovery would not be 
offset by any friendship benefits extrinsic to the idea.  
Still, even if contribution-based recovery occupies an important place 
as a default rule of sorts for breaches of friendship’s fiduciary duties, 
surely sometimes it will not be a proper remedy. Even in the John and 
David hypothetical, it may seem undercompensatory. Indeed, precisely 
because John and David are so much closer to spouses than they are to 
strangers, a remedy closer to marriage’s presumption of “equal sharing”226 
may seem in order: friendship, like marriage, should be, ideally and 
aspirationally through the law, egalitarian. As Dagan acknowledges, 
“[r]eward in proportion to individual contribution or merit is incongruous 
with the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community.”227 So 
sometimes it will make sense to require a friend-defendant to share 
earnings and award a profits-based remedy rather than a contribution-
based remedy. That is a judgment call that will depend on the intensity of 
the friendship—and judges have the capacity to differentiate between 
degrees of friendship for the purpose of constructing an appropriate 
equitable remedy. Perhaps, however, they should presume an absence of a 
spouse-like friendship unless there is clear and convincing evidence 
otherwise. 
IV. THE MISFITS AND THE DANGERS OF TREATING FRIENDS AS 
FIDUCIARIES 
Before concluding, I must briefly confront some hard questions about 
my friends-as-fiduciaries model. Although I believe that, ultimately, our 
law and moral lives would be enhanced by embracing the friends-as-
fiduciaries model, I must highlight ways the analogy between friends and 
fiduciaries may not fit quite as perfectly as I have suggested as well as a 
plausible “counter-vision” of the fiduciary concept that makes salient a 
 
 
reasonable value of the substantially benefiting service and one that “apportions the total net 
enrichment of the defendant according to the respective contributions of the parties.” Id. at 175. Dagan 
prefers the latter because it treats the parties as having been in a joint enterprise. Id. at 175–76. I agree 
and think it is the better way to calculate restitution in friendship-related contexts. 
 226. Id. at 178. 
 227. Id. at 179. 
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substantial set of dangers that could result from more thoroughly adopting 
my recommendations here.  
A. Misfits? 
Despite the general optimism of this Article that friendship relations 
can be neatly mapped onto fiduciary law, there are some ways in which 
the doctrines associated with fiduciary law do not make for a natural fit 
with friendship. I discuss some of these potential gaps here, though 
ultimately conclude that they do not bar broader legal treatment of friends 
as fiduciaries. 
The first potential difficulty is that much of fiduciary law focuses upon 
a fiduciary’s “superiority.” Indeed, although I focus a great deal of 
attention on the trusting nature of the fiduciary relationship, all courts 
require something more than trust—sometimes termed ascendancy, 
dominance, superiority, expertise, or information asymmetry—to find a 
fiduciary relationship.228 The particular challenge this framework poses for 
friendship is that most accounts of friendship put equality at its center. 
Graham Allan, a prominent sociologist of friendship, has observed that the 
“essence of friendship from a sociological perspective is that it is a tie of 
equality.”229 Elsewhere he has written: “Friendship, in whatever form it 
takes, is defined as a relationship between equals. That is, within 
friendship there is little sense of social hierarchy or status difference.”230 
And he is not alone among those who study friendship and friendship 
networks.231 Thus, if friendship is quintessentially about equality232 and 
 
 
 228. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992); Landskroner v. 
Landskroner, 797 N.E.2d 1002, 1013 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2402. 
 229. ALLAN, supra note 98, at 108. 
 230. GRAHAM ALLAN, KINSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP IN MODERN BRITAIN 89 (1996). 
 231. See, e.g., ROBERT BRAIN, FRIENDS AND LOVERS 20 (1976) (“Equality . . . is part and parcel 
of friendship.”); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT ARE FRIENDS FOR? 207 (1993) (contrasting the equality 
of friendship with the unequal power relations in families); Pat O’Connor, Women’s Friendships in a 
Post-Modern World, in PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra note 96, at 117, 127; PAHL, supra 
note 116, at 167 (Friendship is “egalitarian” and “has no place in hierarchies or authoritarian 
structures.”). I summarize the relationship of equality within friendship in Leib, supra note 6, at 646 
(“As between friends, no feelings of superiority are appropriate, and social prestige should be 
irrelevant. Although friends are rarely equal in all ways, true friends treat one another as such. Friends 
give and take equally, or risk rupturing the bond of friendship.”). 
 232. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 8:  
Francis Bacon, on this point, claims that ‘there is little friendship in the world, and least of all 
that between equals.’ I take Bacon’s point to be that equality between people is chiefly a spur 
to rivalry, which can be death on friendship. And Balzac, with that worldly cynicism one 
comes to expect (and enjoy) in him, backs up Bacon by remarking that ‘nothing so fortifies a 
friendship as the belief on the part of one friend that he is superior to the other.’ 
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fiduciary law is always focused upon relationships of inequality, they 
hardly seem like a good match. 
Still, whatever force this argument may have as a matter of rhetoric, it 
lacks substance. As I have demonstrated, what fiduciary law is looking for 
when it uses the language of superiority has nothing to do with social 
prestige or a subjective feeling of superiority on the part of the fiduciary. 
Rather, the inquiry into dominance, ascendancy, or expertise is a proxy for 
the relational variable of vulnerability. Because, as I have already argued, 
this variable is extremely common in friendship—indeed the paradigmatic 
form of trust between friends displays substantial risk and vulnerability—
the legal rhetoric of superiority should not occlude the possibility for 
fiduciaries to stand in relationships of social equality with their 
beneficiaries. Equality does nothing to vitiate vulnerability.233  
A second potential misfit between fiduciary law and friendship is that 
fiduciary law traditionally regulates only one party—the fiduciary, not the 
beneficiary234—and friendship is quite centrally a relationship of 
reciprocity.235 Friends would seem to owe one another duties, and those 
duties are reciprocal. To the extent that fiduciary law is seen as a one-way 
duty, the relationship of friendship does not quite fit because of a 
mutuality of obligation, common to contractual relations and not fiduciary 
ones.  
This structural dissimilarity hardly substantially undermines the friend-
as-fiduciary model proposed here. Even if it were true that there were no 
other examples of reciprocity in fiduciary law,236 there seems to be nothing 
central to the fiduciary concept that would prevent reciprocal duties: Two 
people can trust each other and, in certain circumstances, leave themselves 
especially vulnerable to the other’s predation or exploitation. Reciprocity 
of trust and vulnerability, such as a lawyer and an accountant who have a 
reciprocal relationship of representation, can be contemplated by fiduciary 
law, even if it is not the prototypical case. To be sure, one could 
reasonably make the case that dyads with mutual vulnerability should be 
 
 
 233. In his commentary on this paper at The Conglomerate, Brett McDonnell suggests that 
partnership may also be a useful example to undermine this objection. The default rule in partnership 
is that partners share equally, but they also owe fiduciary duties to each other as well. See Brett 
McDonnell on Leib’s Friends as Fiduciaries, July 30, 2008, http://www.theconglomerate.org/ 
2008/07/brett-mcdonnell.html (citing REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (1994)). 
 234. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 819. 
 235. See, e.g., ALLAN, supra note 98, at 22; Leib, supra note 6, at 644–45.  
 236. But see Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (in which Judge Cardozo 
suggests that partners owe one another seemingly reciprocal fiduciary duties).  
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treated differently from dyads where only one party is vulnerable.237 But 
even if that were true (and it may very well be), I account for this issue by 
delineating the types of fiduciary duties that are appropriate in the 
friendship context. So although mutual reciprocity might call for a 
different application of the menu of fiduciary duties than a one-way 
vulnerability would, there is no clear reason to withhold the title of 
“fiduciary” from the relationships of mutual reciprocity when they 
otherwise fit the bill. 
A final potential dissimilarity between the friend and the fiduciary has 
to do with the right of free exit from the relationship. To be sure, in 
fiduciary law, “[a]n important means of controlling misbehavior in most 
[fiduciary] relationships is the [beneficiary’s] right to terminate the 
relationship or to replace” the fiduciary.238 But the fiduciary has much 
more limited termination rights.239 Thus, one might say that the liberal 
ideal of free exit is substantially circumscribed in fiduciary relations; even 
beneficiaries have difficulties exercising their rights of termination.240 
Friendship, by contrast, achieves some of its value in many people’s eyes 
precisely because it seems to allow for free exit by both parties. Not only 
does the choice to enter voluntarily define the relationship (in 
contradistinction to many relationships of status and kinship), so does the 
choice to stay in it and maintain it. The background principle of free exit 
helps reinforce friendship’s value.241 
Interesting as this seeming distinction between friendship and fiduciary 
relationships may be, it is hard to take seriously the idea that friends can 
perfectly “freely” exit their friendships without consequences (unless one 
is comparing it to the exit costs of marriage). As in the case of fiduciary 
relations, exit is hampered by substantial roadblocks. It is not easy to get 
out of friendships once they are formed. Moreover, whatever value may 
derive from a background presumption of free exit must be complicated by 
the reality that any act of termination comes with very weighty costs: if it 
is free, it probably was not a friendship of much value after all. Finally, 
free exit seems to be the rule in at least one central fiduciary relationship: 
principal-agent.242 
 
 
 237. Thanks to Hanoch Dagan for pushing me hard on this issue. 
 238. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2428. 
 239. See FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 310 (citing an attorney’s limited right of withdrawal in the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and a partner’s restrictions on withdrawal). 
 240. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2428–29. 
 241. I discuss voluntarism in friendship in Leib, supra note 6, at 642, 663–67, and supra note 96. 
 242. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10(1) (2006) (“Notwithstanding any agreement 
between principal and agent, an agent’s actual authority terminates if the agent renounces it by a 
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I have not, of course, surveyed here every way fiduciary law and 
friendship might be difficult to assimilate. But I have tried to show how a 
few apparent dissimilarities do not stand in the way of seeing how the two 
helpfully illuminate one another. 
B. The Dangers for Fiduciary Law and Friendship 
Beyond mere misfit, there are potentially significant dangers that might 
be associated with the friend-as-fiduciary model. Below, I address one 
from the perspective of fiduciary law and one from the perspective of 
friendship. To the extent that these dangers have already been given 
expression (in the work of Larry Ribstein, especially), they are overstated 
and do not furnish very good reasons to refuse to treat close friends as 
fiduciaries. Both dangers stem from the unintended consequences that can 
result from regulating private behavior too intensely. 
1. Stretching Fiduciary Law Too Far? 
Recently, Larry Ribstein has forcefully called for a narrowing of 
fiduciary duty law, suggesting that it cover only a small fraction of the 
types of cases fiduciary doctrine now clearly covers.243 He wishes for 
fiduciary law to apply only in “paradigm broad-delegation scenarios,”244 
and he wishes for fiduciary law to delineate much more clearly the types 
of relationships to which fiduciary law will be applied. As he writes, 
“[r]ather than comparing costs and benefits of fiduciary duties on a case-
by-case basis, or providing for a continuum of relationships that involve 
varying levels of duties, it is better to define a specific category of cases in 
which a Meinhard-like fiduciary duty of unselfishness applies.”245 And it 
is not just for the sake of clarity that Ribstein justifies his desire to 
circumscribe fiduciary duty law: “Overuse of fiduciary duties increases 
litigation and contracting costs, decreases the effectiveness of owners’ 
governance rights, and dilutes true fiduciaries’ legal and extralegal 
 
 
manifestation to the principal or if the principal revokes the agent’s actual authority by a manifestation 
to the agent. A revocation or a renunciation is effective when the other party has notice of it.”). Thanks 
to Deborah DeMott for this point. 
 243. See generally Ribstein, supra note 13. 
 244. Id. at 213. Although Ribstein surely does not intend to have friendship included in the small 
list of fiduciary relationships he would recognize, friendship might come even within his cramped 
definition: we give broad-scale delegations to our friends with very substantial access to our emotional 
lives (and sometimes our capital).  
 245. Id. 
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incentives.”246 Accordingly, Ribstein sees a substantial danger to the goals 
and effectiveness of fiduciary law (and unnecessary costs to parties who 
may decide to use contracts to avoid some of the consequences of 
fiduciary law)247 when it gets stretched into new areas where he thinks 
private ordering would be preferable. 
Yet, as Ribstein would have to concede, fiduciary law is just too messy 
for his vision to take hold in the law anytime soon. Fiduciary law’s 
flexibility and applicability to a broad set of relationships with a sliding 
scale of duties and remedies is so much a part of its fabric that Ribstein’s 
vision is more of a misfit with the reality of fiduciary law than any claim I 
make here on behalf of friendship. Indeed, as I have shown above,248 many 
courts already recognize the very model of the fiduciary elaborated here. 
Friendship need not, therefore, be seen as an expansion of the fiduciary 
concept at all; it can be seen, rather, as an underappreciated exemplar. 
Moreover, as I have already discussed, Ribstein’s worry about courts 
squandering their moral authority by employing fiduciary rhetoric in too 
many circumstances rings especially hollow in the friendship context, 
where there need not be a substantial gap between legal and moral 
standards of conduct.249 In fact, I made a substantial effort to tailor a law 
 
 
 246. Id. at 251. 
 247. In this Article, I have decided to side-step the question of whether the fiduciary duties of 
friendship should be default rules that may be avoided by contract or whether they should be thought 
of as mandatory rules (though many of Ribstein’s arguments seem predicated on fiduciary duties being 
mandatory, notwithstanding his deep commitment to contractarianism). On this general debate about 
contractarianism and fiduciary duties, see, for example, Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation 
of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 451 (2006); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting 
Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5. I have given this question some attention in Leib, supra note 6, at 
683–84 n.267, 706 n.423.  
 Although I cannot tackle this decades-long debate among scholars of fiduciary law in this context, 
I can make one observation relevant to the friend-as-fiduciary model elaborated here, which may have 
some potentially broader applications. Since many of the fiduciary duties to be applied within 
friendships involve certain kinds of conduct surrounding the contracting process (the duties of good 
faith, fair dealing, fair price, disclosure), it makes little sense to allow parties to contract out of these 
duties because such contracts themselves would be subject to the very same constraints fiduciary law 
imposes. This logical point, however, does not apply to every fiduciary duty: aspects of the duties of 
loyalty and confidentiality may be sensibly waived. So there may be a middle road in which some 
duties can be contracted around and some must remain mandatory. This is especially true within 
friendship, where there is no standard form. When the law approaches friendship and interposes itself 
into friendship, it must do so with sensitivity to friendship’s variety, some of which relevant contracts 
can usefully illuminate. 
 248. See supra Part III.A. To be sure, although I exposed the law’s “ambivalence” toward the idea 
of friends as fiduciaries, there is a much stronger doctrinal basis for the friend-as-fiduciary idea than 
there is for Ribstein’s view. 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 117–18. Nevertheless, Ribstein’s point about litigation 
costs might remain: Are the social benefits of treating friends as fiduciaries worth the costs in terms of 
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of friends-as-fiduciaries so that it would not depart too far from our moral 
intuitions about how far the law should intervene in our private 
relationships.250  
2. Crowding Trust 
The threat posed to fiduciary law likely to result from treating friends 
as fiduciaries is minimal. But it may be that there are threats to friendship 
itself that might result from broader recognition of the friend as a 
fiduciary. What if exacting legally enforceable fiduciary duties from 
friends deters not only opportunism but friendship itself? As Ribstein 
writes, “Requiring fiduciaries to act unselfishly, and accept potential 
liability, obviously deters people from becoming fiduciaries.”251 More 
disturbingly still, what if legal regulation of the “strong form”252 trust in 
friendships actually served to crowd it out? If law replaces trust, a regime 
of trust enforcement actually undermines the very important brand of trust 
it was seeking to protect! 
Ribstein’s scholarship focuses on similar questions about the many 
current and proposed uses of fiduciary duty law, though he has never 
focused his attention upon friendship. One could reasonably assume, 
however, given his desire to constrict the reach of fiduciary law, that he 
would launch a similar argument against treating friends as fiduciaries, 
emphasizing what fiduciary law would do to ruin the strong form of trust 
that friendship engenders and sustains. He would likely highlight that 
friendship relies on extralegal mechanisms for enforcement (like 
reputation and morality) and that law could rarely be said to enforce 
parties’ expectations meaningfully because “the parties do not necessarily 
 
 
producing more litigation, and likely more spurious litigation? One might argue that social benefits 
certainly accrue from joint business ventures and marriages where fiduciary duties are common but 
that the public benefits of friendship are much more subtle and do not easily look like they can 
counterbalance the costs. Lynn Stout has pressed me on this issue especially. 
 Subtle though they may be, the benefits are not negligible. I expend great effort in two previous 
articles to explain why the “cost” is worth it and just what sort of public benefits we can hope to 
capture by using the law to support the institution of friendship. They include public health benefits, 
the stimulation of new modalities of thought, the stimulation of the economy, and the saving of 
enforcement costs in the legal system itself. See generally Leib, supra note 6; Leib, supra note 196. 
 250. See Mitchell, supra note 104, at 205 (“In order for the law to be effective, the legal structure 
reinforcing trust must set forth principles which are both reasonable and ascertainable. . . . If the trust 
embodied in the law requires too great a level of self-sacrifice in light of our personal goals, the system 
either will be rejected or fall into eventual desuetude.”). 
 251. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 217. 
 252. This concept is developed in Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source 
of Competitive Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175, 179 (1994), and is discussed in Ribstein, 
supra note 9, at 558–68. 
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assume the law will back these expectations.”253 Further, he would draw 
upon empirical evidence that law would actually undermine trust: 
Experiments show that providing incentives or penalties for good or 
poor performance actually undermines voluntary cooperation and 
thereby makes such arrangements less efficient than relying on 
voluntary cooperation. Legal enforcement also may reduce feelings 
of reciprocity that enhance voluntary cooperation. Parties have been 
shown to be more likely to cooperate voluntarily when the incentive 
is a positive bonus for good behavior than when it is a negative fine 
for bad behavior. Thus, parties who see themselves as adversaries, 
or who are expected to behave selfishly, may behave accordingly. 
Introducing . . . fiduciary duties into close-knit relationships . . . 
requires the parties to negotiate over future litigation, hire lawyers, 
and draft formal documents, as if they were in an arms’ length 
relationship. This encourages them to behave in other respects as 
parties in such a relationship. Planning for litigation becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy.254 
Assuming the validity of the experiments upon which Ribstein’s 
arguments are based (and their appropriate application to the trust within 
friendship), his arguments would seem to have apparent force here. If 
friendship itself—or at least its distinctive form of trust—is what we wish 
to promote,255 legal regulation may be counterproductive and may not 
serve trust at all.256 
There are really two separate claims embedded here. The first is about 
providing people with the right incentives to make friends and the degree 
to which a legal regime that enforced certain duties of friendship would 
deter people from serving as friends. (The second claim, to which I shall 
turn in a moment, is about the law replacing trust altogether.) Even 
scholars from substantially different orientations to fiduciary law concede 
that we need to give people proper incentives to enter fiduciary 
 
 
 253. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 229. 
 254. Id. at 234–35 (citations omitted). The studies upon which Ribstein relies are cited supra note 
9. 
 255. I have already argued in favor of using the law in the service of friendship-promotion in Leib, 
supra note 6, and Leib, supra note 196.  
 256. Although I try in what follows to provide a provisional set of responses to the crowding 
thesis in the particular context of fiduciary law and friendship, there are already several long articles 
that generally critique the crowding thesis more systematically and more comprehensively. See, e.g., 
Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005); Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A 
Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717 (2006). 
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relationships.257 But can we conclude that treating friends as fiduciaries is 
actually likely to deter friendship? 
This particular claim is probably testable. One could test the level and 
intensity of friendship networks in different jurisdictions, and attempt to 
observe if there is any correlation between a given jurisdiction’s fiduciary 
law (with respect to friendship) and that jurisdiction’s levels and intensity 
of friendships. As I highlighted in Part III, many courts already embrace 
the friend-as-fiduciary model in some form, so it should be possible to 
isolate those jurisdictions to see if the law has done anything to deter 
friendship (though, to be fair, there are even intrajurisdictional 
inconsistencies in this area of the law). Until that study is done, we are left 
with mere conjecture. 
But there is, perhaps, an important analogy that might be the basis of 
sound conjecture: marriage.258 Marriage carries with it substantial duties 
that can extend very far into the future even if the marriage dissolves. Yet 
it would be hard to believe that these substantial duties do much to deter 
people from choosing to get married. Perhaps such incidental deterrence 
(incidental because it is clearly not the law’s aim to provide incentives 
against marriage) functions at the margins among those who are 
particularly rationalistic in intimate affairs. But, generally speaking, there 
is reason to suppose that potential incidental deterrence at the margins is 
not a serious reason to prevent the law’s enforcement of special duties 
within marriage relationships.  
Friendship, like marriage, provides so many of its own incentives for 
entry (and it is relatively easy to exit when the costs grow too great) that it 
is hard to imagine legal regulations actually deterring people from 
establishing and developing friendships. To be fair, friendship does not 
carry quite as many legal perquisites as marriage does (nor is it as hard to 
exit),259 so the analogy fails in an important way too: friendship has fewer 
legal advantages to counterbalance the extra duties proposed here.260 
Nevertheless, I think it is fair to conclude that the law will do little—
through the odd enforcement of a fiduciary duty in an extreme case of 
 
 
 257. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 833. 
 258. See generally Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 75 (2004).  
 259. I explore these in Leib, supra note 196, and Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. 
Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147. 
 260. My view is that friendship should carry more legal perquisites, but I perfectly concede that 
marriage carries many more under current legal rules. See Leib, supra note 6; Leib, supra note 196. 
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disloyalty—to prevent people from enjoying the very real, albeit non-
legal, advantages of friendship.261 
However, a legal regime that does exact special duties from friends will 
likely result in people being much more clear with one another about their 
relationship’s status. In this way, fiduciary duties and their potential 
enforcement will serve an “information-forcing” function,262 helping 
parties organize their intimate affairs and enabling them to have a better 
sense of the identities of their real friends. In a world where friendship 
carries legal consequences, many people will try to disclaim that they are 
friends with the people with whom they are transacting. Sometimes, such 
disclaimers would be hard for courts to take seriously; other times, 
disclaimers would helpfully prevent someone from thinking a party is a 
friend when he has sent every signal to help a potential plaintiff avoid 
unjustifiable reliance.263  
And there is nothing wrong with friendship disclaimers in the abstract: 
as Aristotle well understood, most tension within friendships results 
because people are not clear about their relational intent and tend to lead 
other people on.264 Making people more honest about how close they feel 
toward the people with whom they interact would likely save many a lot of 
personal pain.265 Thus, although certain types of fictive friendships may be 
 
 
 261. Just because the law can do little to undermine the benefits of friendship does not mean that 
the law can do little to support the institution. I do not think saying that friendship can survive an 
occasional legal incursion actually undermines the idea that legal protection can usefully help 
friendship as an institution. Of course, it is hard to prove any of this, and it relies on one’s intuitions. 
But family and marriage strikes me as a useful analogy here: burdening family members with special 
duties does not, as a general matter, make us think that trust is being crowded out. Rather, part of the 
reason we burden families is to protect them and to support the special vulnerability within them. Is it 
inconsistent to argue that the law should engage in this protection through an occasional legal burden? 
I see the tension, of course, but it does not seem all that hard to see how to resolve it. The burden will 
not crowd out the trust and may serve to protect vulnerability within. So, too, in friendship. Thanks to 
Curtis Bridgeman for pushing me to make this clearer. 
 262. Indeed, this dynamic—of fiduciary duties forcing information disclosure—is at the center of 
the “contractarian” view of fiduciary duty law. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426, 
445. As I suggested supra note 247, I do not take a strong view here about “contractarianism” in 
fiduciary duty law. But I think both “contractarians” and “non-contractarians” could embrace my 
friend-as-fiduciary model, notwithstanding their different approaches to whether the bulk of the 
fiduciary duties are default rules or mandatory ones. 
 263. But see Anderson, supra note 15, at 327–30 (arguing that courts seek objective evidence and 
discount subjective evidence in determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists); id. at 330 (“A 
contract provision denying the existence of a confidential relationship . . . when in fact such a 
relationship did exist, should always be invalid and unenforceable. It would, in effect, represent a 
disclaimer of fiduciary liability which, under the familiar rule everywhere, is void as against public 
policy.”); Westfall, supra note 15, at 857 n.142 (citing cases where Texas courts utilized objective 
evidence to establish that parties were, in fact, close friends). 
 264. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 233, 243. 
 265. See Leib, supra note 6, at 706 n.423. 
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deterred, real ones might be intensified, and parties will be able to send 
more credible signals about their intent to be trustworthy since legal 
sanctions will attach to those who betray trust. 
The second claim, this one with some relevant empirical support, also 
seems somewhat overstated. The major concern is that law will crowd out 
trust and replace the important social resource of strong-form trust with a 
thin legal version that will not be able to perform all the functions that the 
strong form can. As Ribstein puts it, “[i]n short, legal coercion does not 
help develop norms of trustworthiness or of trust. Moreover, . . . regulation 
impedes development of trust norms by interfering with opportunities to 
be genuinely trusting or trustworthy.”266 
There are two important responses to this line of argument. First, and 
most importantly, the argument seems predicated on the assumption that 
one can have either strong-form trust that operates outside the law or 
legally policed trust, and that in a given context they must be substitutes 
rather than complements. But that assumption, explicit in Ribstein’s 
work,267 virtually guarantees the crowding conclusion. In any case, the 
premise is flawed. It simply is not true that “the fact that there is some 
reliance on the threat of sanctions mean[s] that there will be no room for 
trust.”268 This is as true in the context of friendship as it is in our 
relationships with our doctors, cell phone companies, cable companies, 
meat producers, baby toy producers, and virtually every person with 
whom we contract.269 We may have to resort to legal sanctions (whether 
stemming from contract law, tort law, property law, consumer protection 
law, employment law, etc.), but this never crowds out fully the need for 
trust and the reality of the possibility for some level of vulnerability. I 
know I can sue my doctor or the hospital if something untoward happens 
to me when I am under anesthesia. But that sort of trust in sanctions does 
not help me choose a doctor or hospital, nor does it enable me to develop a 
good relationship central to my well-being. Indeed, even the perfectly 
rational calculators among us know that our legal remedies will tend to be 
undercompensatory (when they are available at all—we might lose our 
remedies because of technicalities, bad lawyers, unreliable juries, statutes 
 
 
 266. Ribstein, supra note 9, at 567.  
 267. Id. at 568 (“[L]aw must be regarded as a substitute for rather than complement of social 
capital because it undermines the institutions that create it.”). 
 268. BAIER, supra note 100, at 139. 
 269. See Mitchell, supra note 104, at 194 (arguing that we reasonably trust many others 
notwithstanding imperfect information and imperfect policing mechanisms for violating that trust); 
Erin A. O’Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES 
IN THE ECONOMY (Paul J. Zak ed., 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=929503. 
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of limitations, or other unrelated legal difficulties, all of which we could 
anticipate as a real risk from the outset). And even if the law punishes 
really bad babysitters, that punishment will rarely make us feel whole 
when a babysitter has killed our child through her negligence. Money 
damages cannot always fully recompense betrayed trust. Thus, the 
crowding thesis, even if it is defensible at some level, leaves plenty of 
room for developing the important kind of trust that makes the world go 
round, even if the law intervenes in some cases. Indeed, as Larry Mitchell 
has argued, “certain preconditions, like a legal system sustaining the 
values of trust, are necessary for trust to flourish.”270 Law makes trust 
possible, in part. 
Again here, marriage is a helpful, if imperfect, analogy. Just because 
marriage is controlled by contracts, legal regulation, and a set of 
mandatory duties cannot render legal sanctions as substitutes for trust. 
There is no doubt that regulation complements and will have some 
interaction effects with trust. But the crowding thesis in its strong form 
does not make sense, whether in friendship or in marriage. The law can 
play a facilitative role as much as it can stand in the way. 
There is yet a further reason to be skeptical of the crowding thesis. 
Crowding is most likely to result—and most likely to serve as a substitute 
rather than a complement—when there is an environment of perfect 
enforcement. Yet, fiduciary duty law is notable for its inability to police 
behavior at the micro level. Indeed, its rhetoric is as strong as it is, in part, 
because its standards can rarely be met and fiduciaries are so capable of 
getting away with their betrayals. In a legal landscape of very imperfect 
enforcement and regulation, trust is far from crowded out. 
In the friendship context, imperfect enforcement is likely to be even 
more widespread: unlike the thought of suing our trustees, corporate 
officers, and lawyers, there is surely substantial stigma associated with 
suing our friends. No amount of legal regulation will remove that stigma 
because, for the most part, suing our friends is a way of ending a 
friendship. Indeed, the suit is pretty strong evidence that the friendship is 
beyond repair.271 What this means is that the crowding phenomenon will 
make only small incursions into our friendships’ basis in strong-form trust; 
the law will help frame friends’ self-conception without intruding too 
heavily into the intimate sphere, where aspects of our closest friendships 
 
 
 270. Mitchell, supra note 104, at 204. 
 271. There is at least one way this may be incorrect: friends might collude to collect on one of 
their insurance policies. See Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631 (Idaho 1940) (a friend-patient sues a friend-
doctor, whose insurance he believes will pay for his recovery). 
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will remain.272 Sometimes fiduciary law merely expresses social norms 
without actually being a very good enforcer of them—and considering the 
possible validity of the crowding thesis, that may be a good thing too. Law 
will not likely crowd out trust in close friendships and, even if it does 
some, coherence and the sound legal concept of the fiduciary still 
recommend treating the friend as a legal fiduciary. 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
The fiduciary concept recognized by our law is a flexible one. I have 
argued here that it is flexible enough to encompass enforcement of certain 
duties of friendship that we all know well from our moral lives. 
Friendship—of a certain sort, to be sure—is undoubtedly a relationship of 
trust and vulnerability, and fiduciary law is set up specifically to give 
effect to and frame this sort of special relationship. Even if some are 
ultimately persuaded that the misfit between the friend and the legal 
fiduciary is too severe or that recognizing the friend as a fiduciary would 
be too damaging to fiduciary law or the institution of friendship itself, 
much can be learned from putting fiduciary law and friendship side-by-
side. Indeed, there are lessons of proper conduct that friends would do 
well to internalize even if they will never carry the force of law.  
Moreover, whatever one thinks of the normative agenda presented here 
of trying to get more courts to appreciate the trust and vulnerability 
constitutive of close friendships, I have shown that the law in many 
jurisdictions already treats certain types of friends as fiduciaries and that 
many plaintiffs ask courts to treat defendant-friends (or former friends) as 
fiduciaries, subject to their special duties and remedial opportunities. This 
Article should help guide courts when they are presented with such claims, 
and should enable them to adjudicate these cases more systematically and 
with greater sophistication. Nothing I have argued for here suggests that 
all friends qualify for fiduciary treatment; rather, courts must not fear that 
there is some category mistake being made by those claiming fiduciary 
duties from their friends or former friends. 
 
 
 272. I actually think that the entire “separate spheres” story that neatly divides the social and the 
legal is deeply flawed and very untrue to our experience in the worlds of the intimate and the law. See 
generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005). But that is an argument for 
another day.  
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